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Brazilian socialist Israel Dutra interviews Swiss-Syrian activist and academic Joseph Daher about the situation in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Daher’s book, Syria after the Uprisings: The Political Economy of State Resilience, was recently translated and published in Brazil by Contrabando. This extensive interview took place on December 10.

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Bashar Al Assad has fled Syria. This surprised many and represents a really big change. Could you explain what is happening?

Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a military campaign on November 27 against the Syrian regime’s forces, scoring stunning victories. In less than a week, HTS and SNA took control of most of Aleppo and Idlib governorates. Then, the city Hama, located 210 kilometres north of Damascus, fell into the hands of HTS and SNA following intense military confrontations between them and regime forces supported by the Russian air force. Following Hama, HTS took control of Homs.

Initially, the Syrian regime sent reinforcements to Hama and Homs, and then, with the support of the Russian air force, bombed the cities of Idlib and Aleppo and its surroundings. On December 1–2, more than 50 airstrikes hit Idlib. At least four health facilities, four school facilities, two displacement camps and a water station were impacted. The airstrikes displaced more than 48,000 people and severely disrupted services and aid delivery. The dictator Assad had promised defeat to his enemies and stated that “terrorism only understands the discourse of force”. But his regime was already crumbling from everywhere.

While the regime was losing town after town, the southern governorates of Suweida and Daraa liberated themselves; their popular and local armed opposition forces, separate and distinct from HTS and SNA, seized control. Regime forces then withdrew from localities about ten kilometres from the capital Damascus, and abandoned their positions in the province of Quneitra, which borders the Golan Heights that is occupied by Israel.

As different opposition armed forces, again not HTS nor SNA, approached Damascus, regime forces just crumbled and withdrew, while demonstrations and the burning of all symbols of Assad multiplied in the various suburbs of Damascus. On the night of December 7–8, it was announced that Damascus was liberated. The exact fate and location of Assad was initially unknown, but some information indicates that he is in Russia under the protection of Moscow.

Following the historical announcement of the fall of Assad’s dynasty, which has ruled Syria since the 1970s, we saw videos of popular demonstrations throughout the country, from Damascus, Tartous, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Qamichli, Suwaida, etc of all religious sects and ethnicities, destroying statues and symbols of the Assad family.

And, of course, there is great happiness for the liberation of political prisoners from the regime’s prisons, particularly Sednaya prison — known as the “human slaughterhouse” — that could contain 10–20,000 prisoners. Some of them have been detained since the 1980s. Similarly, people, who had been displaced in 2016 or earlier, from Aleppo and other cities, have been able to return to their homes and neighbourhoods, seeing their families for the first time in years.

In addition to other elements, the fall of the regime reflects two main dynamics.

First, the main allies of the Syrian regime have been weakened. Russian military forces have been focusing on their imperialist war against Ukraine, and the displacement of some of its forces and resources since 2022. Its involvement in Syria has therefore, so far, been significantly more limited than in similar military operations in recent years. Iran, and more particularly the Lebanese party Hezbollah, have been weakened considerably following Israel’s war against the Gaza Strip and against Lebanon more recently. Tel Aviv has also increased its bombing campaign against Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria in the past few months. Hezbollah is definitely facing its greatest challenge since its foundation, with the assassinations of key military and political leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, who ruled over the party for 32 years, as well as significant weakening of its military structures.

Second, the fall of the regime proved its structural weakness — militarily, economically and politically. It collapsed like a house of cards. This is hardly surprising because it seemed clear that soldiers were not going to fight for the Assad regime, given their poor wages and conditions. They preferred to flee or just not fight rather than defend a regime for which they have very little sympathy, especially because a lot of them had been forcefully conscripted.

There are a lot of challenges for the future, but at least hope has come back. Looking at HTS and SNA’s policies in the past, they have not encouraged a democratic space to develop; quite the opposite. They have been authoritarian. No trust should be accorded to such forces. Only the self-organisation of popular classes fighting for democratic and progressive demands will create that space and open a path toward actual liberation. This will depend on overcoming many obstacles from war fatigue to repression, poverty and social dislocation.

Your book Syria after the Uprisings was recently published in Brazil. Can you tell us a bit about the book, as it is one of the best Marxist works looking at events in Syria amid the Arab Spring of 2011.

Thank you for your kind words. The book’s purpose was to seek to understand the resilience of the regime and the failings of the initial popular uprising, while also taking a closer look at the counter-revolutionary processes that have been undermining the uprising from without and within. Through a sharp reconstruction of the key historical developments, I focused on the reasons behind the transition of a peaceful uprising into a destructive war with multiple regional and international actors.

What are the main groups in conflict amid this new situation? How would you characterise the main actors in the Syrian opposition that have just overthrown Assad?

The successful seizure of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and of other territories in a military campaign led by HTS reflects in many ways the evolution of this movement over several years into a more disciplined and more structured organisation, both politically and militarily. It now can produce drones and runs a military academy. HTS has been able to impose its hegemony on a certain number of military groups, through repression and inclusion in the past few years. Based on these developments, it positioned itself to launch this attack.

It has become a quasi-state actor in the areas it controls. It has established a government, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), which acts as HTS’ civil administration and provides services. There has been a clear willingness by HTS and SSG in the past few years to present themselves as a rational force to regional and international powers in order to normalise its rule. This has notably resulted in more and more space for some NGOs to operate in key sectors such as education and healthcare, in which SSG lacks financial resources and expertise.

This does not mean that no corruption exists in areas under its rule. It has enforced its rule through authoritarian measures and policing. HTS has notably repressed or limited activities it considers as contrary to its ideology. For instance, HTS stopped several projects supporting women, particularly camp residents, under the pretext that these cultivated ideas of gender equality that were hostile to its rule. HTS has also targeted and detained political opponents, journalists, activists and people it viewed as critics or opponents.

HTS, which is still categorized as a terrorist organisation by many powers, including the United States, has also been trying to project a more moderate image of itself in an attempt to win recognition that it is now a rational and responsible actor. This evolution dates back to the rupture of its ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and its reframing of its political objectives in the Syrian national framework. It has also repressed individuals and groups connected to al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State.

In February 2021, for his first interview with a US journalist, its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, or Ahmed al-Sharaa (his real name), declared that the region he controlled “does not represent a threat to the security of Europe and America”, asserting that areas under its rule would not become a base for operations abroad. In this attempt to define himself as a legitimate interlocutor on the international scene, he emphasised the group’s role in fighting against terrorism. As part of this makeover, HTS has allowed the return of Christians and Druze in some areas and established contacts with some leaders from these communities.

Following the capture of Aleppo, HTS continued to present itself as a responsible actor. HTS fighters for instance immediately posted videos in front of banks, offering assurances that they wanted to protect private property and assets. They also promised to protect civilians and minority religious communities, particularly Christians, because they know that the fate of this community is closely scrutinised abroad.

Similarly, HTS has made numerous statements promising similar protection of Kurds and Islamic minorities such as Ismaelis and Druzes. It issued a statement regarding Alawites that called on them to break with the regime, without however suggesting that HTS would protect them or saying anything clear about their future. In this statement, HTS describes the Alawite community as an instrument of the regime against the Syrian people.

Finally, al-Jolani has stated that the city of Aleppo will be managed by a local authority, and all military forces, including those of HTS, will fully withdraw from the city in the coming weeks. It is clear that al-Jolani wants to actively engage with local, regional and international powers.

However, it is still an open question as to whether HTS will follow through on these statements. HTS has been an authoritarian and reactionary organisation with an Islamic fundamentalist ideology, and still has foreign fighters within its ranks. Many popular demonstrations in the past few years have occurred in Idlib against its rule and violations of political freedoms and human rights, including assassinations and torture of opponents.

It is not enough to tolerate religious or ethnic minorities or allow them to pray. The key issue is recognising their rights as equal citizens participating in deciding the future of the country. More generally, statements by al-Jolani such as “people who fear Islamic governance either have seen incorrect implementations of it or do not understand it properly”, are definitely not reassuring, but quite the opposite.

Regarding the Turkish-backed SNA, it is a coalition of armed groups mostly with conservative Islamic politics. It has a very bad reputation and is guilty of numerous human rights violations, especially against Kurdish populations in areas under their control. They notably participated in the Turkish-led military campaign to occupy Afrin in 2018, leading to the forced displacement of around 150,000 civilians, the vast majority of them Kurds.

In the current military campaign, once again SNA mainly serves Turkish objectives in targeting areas controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) and areas with large Kurdish populations. The SNA has, for instance, captured the city of Tal Rifaat and Shahba area in northern Aleppo, previously under SDF governance, leading to the forced displacement of more than 150,000 civilians and many violations of human rights against Kurdish individuals, including assassinations and kidnappings. The SNA then announced a military offensive, supported by the Turkish army, on the city of Manbij, home to 100,000 civilians and controlled by the SDF.

There are, therefore, differences between HTS and SNA. The HTS has a relative autonomy from Turkey in contrast to the SNA, which is controlled by Turkey and serves its interests. The two forces are different, pursue distinct goals, and have conflicts between them, although for the moment these have been kept under wraps. For instance, HTS is currently not seeking to confront the SDF. In addition to this, the SNA published a critical statement against HTS for their “aggressive behaviour” against SNA members, while HTS reportedly blamed SNA fighters for looting.

As mentioned earlier, the armed opposition groups in the South include a variety of types of local armed forces. For instance, in Daraa, many of them are former groups who acted under the label of the Free Syrian Army.

What can you tell us about the Kurdish issue, given the weight that the SDF has in terms of controlling entire regions in the north and east of the country?

Alongside the dynamics I mentioned above, others have included the north of Syria, with implications of the Kurdish issue in Syria. The SNA first led attacks on territories controlled by the SDF in northern Aleppo, and then, on December 8, with the support of the Turkish army, air force and artillery, entered the SDF-controlled city of Manbij.

Second, the SDF has captured most of Deir-ez-Zor governorate, formerly controlled by Syrian regime forces and pro-Iran militias, after they had withdrawn to redeploy in other areas to fight against HTS and SNA. SDF then extended their control over vast swaths of the northeast previously under the regime’s domination.

The territories under the control of the SDF are under threats. Now with the fall of the regime, Turkey’s influence is even more important in Syria and probably makes it the key regional actor in the country. Ankara is seeking to confront the SDF and weaken it. SDF is dominated by the armed wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, a sister organisation of Turkey’s Kurdish party, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as terrorist by Ankara, the US and the European Union.

Turkey has two other main objectives.

First, they aim to carry out the forced return of Syrian refugees in Turkey back to Syria.

Second, they want to deny Kurdish aspirations for autonomy and more specifically undermine the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES, also called Rojava), which would set a precedent for Kurdish self-determination in Turkey — a threat to the regime as it is currently constituted.

There is indeed a need to tackle the country’s central ethnic division between Arabs and Kurds. Progressive forces must wage a clear struggle against Arab chauvinism to overcome this division and forge solidarity between these populations. This has been a challenge from the start of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and will have to be confronted and resolved in a progressive manner in order for the country’s people to be truly liberated.

There is a desperate need to return to the original aspirations of the Syrian Revolution for democracy, social justice and equality — and in a fashion that upholds Kurdish self-determination.

What impact has international geopolitics had on developments in Syria, for example Russian imperialism being forced to direct its energies against Ukraine and the ongoing genocide in Palestine and Lebanon? What are the most likely immediate effects of what has occurred in Syria?

Russia and Iran initially pledged to support the regime. But this clearly did not work. Despite Russian bombing of areas outside of the control of the regime, the rebels’ advance was undeterred.

Both powers have a lot to lose in Syria. For Iran, Syria is crucial for the transfer of weapons to, and logistic coordination with, Hezbollah. It was actually rumoured before the fall of the regime that the Lebanese party had sent a small number of “supervisory forces” to Homs to assist the regime’s military forces, and 2000 soldiers to the city of Qusayr, one of its strongholds in Syria near the border with Lebanon, to defend it in the event of an attack by the rebels. As the regime was falling, it withdrew its forces.

Russia’s Hmeimim airbase in Syria’s Latakia province, and its naval facility at Tartous on the coast, have been important sites for Russia to assert its geopolitical clout in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Africa. Loss of these bases would undermine Russia’s status, as its intervention in Syria has been used as an example of how it can use military force to shape events outside of its borders and compete with Western states. We will see what will happen between the new forces in power in Syria and Russia.

Otherwise, it is still hard to tell what impact the regime’s fall will have on the regional and imperial dynamics. For the US and Western states, the main objective is now damage control to prevent chaos extending into the region. After the fall of the regime, US officials declared that they will maintain their presence in eastern Syria, about 900 soldiers, and will take measures necessary to prevent a resurgence of Islamic State. They bombed different areas of Syria targeting ISIS, according to them.

For their part, Israeli officials declared that the “collapse of the Assad regime would likely create chaos in which military threats against Israel would develop”. Moreover, Israel has never really supported the overthrow of the Syrian regime, all the way back to the attempted revolution in 2011. In July 2018, Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not object to Assad taking back control of the country and stabilising his power. After the fall of the regime, Israel has bombed weapons depots in southern Syria and the capital Damascus and invaded territory in Syrian-controlled areas of the Golan Heights.

Regional Arab states are clearly not satisfied with the current situation, as they had entered a normalisation process with the regime in the past few years.

Regarding Turkey, its main objective will be to consolidate its power and influence in Syria and get rid of the Kurdish-led AANES in the northeast. Turkey’s top diplomat actually said on December 8 that the Turkish state was in contact with rebels in Syria to ensure that Islamic State and specifically the “PKK” do not take advantage of the fall of the Damascus regime to extend their influence.

An additional impact to take into consideration is the weakening of Iran’s regional influence, and therefore of Hezbollah’s in Lebanon, with the fall of the regime. This is a significant blow for Teheran and its Lebanese ally.

The different powers have, however, a common objective: to impose a form of authoritarian stability in Syria and the region. That, of course, does not mean unity between the regional and imperial powers. They each have their own, often antagonistic, interests. But they do not want the destabilisation of the Middle East and North Africa.

[Reprinted from . First published in Portuguese by .]