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Sri Lanka’s September 21 presidential elections resulted in a historic change in representative politics, following the 2022 popular uprising that unseated Gotabaya Rajapaksa — a powerful president from a dynastic political family and military background.

A working-class party, the People’s Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP), gained power for the first time, this year, through the election of 55-year-old JVP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake as the country’s new president, under the coalition National People’s Power (Jathika Jana Balawegaya, NPP). The NPP is a broad alliance of unions, political parties, women’s groups, youth groups, civil society groups and activist networks.

One of the NPP’s key themes was the fight against corruption, nepotism, economic waste and mismanagement. This was also on the agenda during the 2022 uprising, which echoed the slogan “system change”. The NPP’s victory has enabled a sliver of hope for renewing democracy and reducing inequality.

The NPP’s election manifesto sits firmly within a social democratic frame, focused on continuing the country’s export-based economy, while strengthening social protections.

While the JVP maintains its ideological commitment as a Marxist working-class party, there is no real effort towards a post-capitalist or an ecosocialist project. The 2012 split in the JVP, which resulted in the formation of the Frontline Socialist Party (FSP), revealed this contradiction.

In turn, the values of “social justice, economic democracy, solidarity and cooperation, sustainability and corruption-free governance”. However, a key objective is to change the dominant (elitists, clientelist, hyper-masculine, violent) anti-democratic culture of representative party politics.

Rejecting elite politics

Out of 38 candidates — all men — the main contenders were: Ranil Wickramasinghe, incumbent president from the United National Party (UNP); Sajith Premadasa, the main parliamentary opposition leader from United Peoples Power (Samagi Jana Balawegaya, SJB); and Namal Rajapaksa from the Sri Lanka People’s Front (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna, SLPP). Namal is the son of Mahinda Rajapaksa and part of the family dynasty that ruled from 2004–15 and 2019–22.

The fragmentation of the SLPP, following the 2022 uprising, was a key factor strengthening the JVP’s support.

Some activists from the 2022 “Aragalaya” uprising formed the People’s Struggle Alliance (Jana Aragala Viyaparaya, PSA), which was supported by the FSP and ran lawyer Nuwan Bopage as its presidential candidate. Two other socialist candidates with a limited base also ran.

The PSA was the only party that openly criticised the neoliberal policies promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through its economic bailout. It also put forward a comprehensive transitional program to abolish the executive presidency and implement a new people-oriented constitution.

More than 13.6 million (79%) of the 17 million eligible voters turned out on September 21 — less than the 84% who turned out in the 2019 poll that elected Gotabaya Rajapaksa as president. There were more than 13,400 polling stations across 22 electoral districts.

Dissanayake (NPP) received (42%), Premadasa (SJB) 4.4 million (33%), Wickramasinghe (UNP) 2.3 million (17%) and Rajapaksa (SLPP) about 343,000 votes (3%). Ariyanethiran Pakkiyaselvam, representing an alliance of Tamil parties in the North, received 227,000 votes (2%). Meanwhile, in the central parts of the island, Tamil plantation workers’ votes were divided between the NPP and the SJB.

Dissanayake was born in a village in the North Central province, an area of paddy (rice) farmers, and attended a local public high school during the brutal JVP insurrection in 1988–90. He directly experienced the death of close family members and friends by state violence. He later attended public university, actively participated in the student movement and became a member of the JVP’s political bureau in 1997. His main contenders in the election were all members of privileged elite schools in Colombo, and political families.

There was no significant violence on election day, despite most major parties having links with criminal networks. There was, however, violent police repression of protests leading up to the elections.

The lack of violence on polling day can be attributed to a culture of non-violence fostered by the 2022 popular uprising. When the general public retaliated against the brutal attack by the ruling Rajapaksa party’s thugs, it taught the elite political parties a key lesson that their violence will be resisted.

The incumbent president and MPs, with access to state institutions, engaged in the misuse of public servants and resources for campaign purposes. There were also social media violations of electoral regulations. The Election Commission (EC) received about 2000 complaints about social media posts containing hate speech, misinformation and the use of children in propaganda and disinformation. While Meta, YouTube, TikTok and Google removed some illegal posts, they refused to remove others requested by the EC.

The EC is one of nine , including Human Rights, Bribery and Corruption, Public Service, Finance, Police, Audit Service, National Procurement and Delimitation (of electoral boundaries).

These commissions were initially set up to limit the powers of the president and protect the independence of democratic institutions, such as the public service, judiciary, police and electoral system. However, they remain inactive and to varying degrees.

For instance, Wickramasinghe forced the EC to postpone last year’s local government elections by refusing to .

Ranil: From ‘saviour’ to opposition

Ranil Wickramasinghe was elected by a parliamentary vote in August 2022, after Gotobaya Rajapaksa resigned, along with his brother, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, his cabinet and the Central Bank governor.

Wickramasinghe and his team — mostly consisting of members of the previous Rajapaksa regime — had to rescue a bankrupt economy. His image as the saviour of a sinking economy was a key narrative legitimising his rule from 2022–24.

The UNP — in which Wickramasinghe was a prominent MP at the time — introduced the country’s presidential system in 1978, strengthening authoritarian state mechanisms while launching a market-driven economy, attacking the labour movement and restricting workers’ rights and unions.

Wickramasinghe was also part of the authoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalist state, from 1977–94, which unleashed a brutal near-30-year-long anti-Tamil war following the 1983 anti-Tamil pogroms.

Then-President J R Jayawardena, leader of the ruling UNP, blamed the JVP for the violence and banned the party, forcing it underground. Sajith’s father, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who was PM during this period, became president from 1989–93.

Wickramasinghe was minister for education from 1980–88, repressing the student movement while promoting his “reform agenda” and undermining public education. He was appointed industry minister in 1988, under Premadasa.

The 1988–90 JVP insurrection, which emerged as a protest against the devolution of power to the North and the East, and the intervention of the Indian army, was brutally crushed. This was considered a period of terror, involving a massive loss of life (more than 60,000 died) and the launch of numerous paramilitary death squads.

Wickramasinghe was an MP from an electorate that housed a torture chamber (), where between 5–10,000 JVP activists were tortured and killed.

After being elected PM from 2001–04, Wickramasinghe played an instrumental role in undermining then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga. He returned to power as PM from 2015–19, undermining then-President Maithripala Sirisena.

The UNP split in 2020 — one year after Gotabaya’s election and the Rajapaksa regime regained power — resulting in the SJB’s emergence.

The UNP, under Wickramasinghe’s leadership, lost most of its voter base and he was forced to run as an independent candidate at this year’s election.

Those who credit him for rescuing the economy often fail to notice how he failed to rescue his own party at the same time. What he did rescue were the corrupt politicians of the Rajapaksa regime that bankrupted the economy.

After coming to power in 2022, Wickramasinghe was forced to renegotiate external debt with the global creditors by borrowing more money from the IMF. By implementing austerity measures, restricting imports and expanding taxes on consumer goods, he — with the advice of the IMF — stabilised the economy.

An important part of this debt restructuring process was the privatisation of state enterprises, commercialisation of public services and reductions in social protection measures. Import restrictions were gradually removed, exchange rates stabilised and inflation reduced.

However, economic stabilisation took place under rising authoritarianism.

Wickramasinghe was instrumental in crushing the popular uprising towards mid-August 2022, by mobilising the military and the police. Under the (PTA), he arrested protest leaders under dubious charges. Most were released.

He introduced new legislation, a revamped PTA and an “online safety” bill, further restricting freedom of speech and association.

The privatisation and the commercialisation of state enterprises were resisted by the labour movement and a range of civil society actors. These protests were brutally repressed.

While the JVP unions actively participated in these protests in the early stages, following the announcement of the presidential elections, they pulled out.

Meanwhile, military colonisation of the North and East, predominantly Tamil and Muslim communities, continues.

The election of Tamil representatives and the rejection of mainstream (Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalist) parties, including the JVP, in the Northern province reveals the lack of any initiatives towards a based on devolving powers to the North and East. None of the mainstream political parties in the South have proposed the demilitarisation of the North and East.

Significant victory

The JVP’s (NPP’s) electoral victory is significant. It highlights a strategic alliance between a working-class political party and democratic social movements.

The NPP actively engaged with local networks, building a range of alliances among, youth, women, farmers, small and medium business owners, intellectuals, artists, military personnel and religious groups.

The NPP’s election manifesto is mostly a centrist (social democratic) policy agenda. It proposes a “green capitalist” model with limited effort to strengthen union rights and collective bargaining institutions, as well as to seriously address climate mitigation (shifting dependence away from fossil fuels).

Importantly, the JVP won only 3% of the vote at the 2019 presidential elections, when Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected with 52%. Raising its vote from 3% to 42% is a major achievement, which would not have been possible without the 2022 uprising.

Nevertheless, winning 5.6 million votes (44%) out of 12.8 million is a long way from a majority.

More importantly, the ruling elites and the mainstream media were engaged in misinformation and disinformation campaigns against the JVP in the election, citing the events of the 1988–90 insurrection. The JVP was framed as a violent culprit, while state violence — including death squads — were seemingly forgotten and forgiven. Meanwhile, families are still searching for loved ones who disappeared during that period.

Efforts to discredit the JVP for its past violence disregard the violence of the state, which continues via a bloated, tax-payer-subsidised military, which is also engaged in commercial activities.

The NPP’s presidential victory is simply a beginning towards the democratisation of the state. The next major challenge will be the parliamentary elections. The parliament was dissolved on September 24, and general elections are planned for November 14.

The parliament is still dominated by former Rajapaksa-allied Sinhala-Buddhist ethno-nationalist, hypermasculine and mostly corrupt politicians. Following public protests, Wickremasinghe-appointed health minister Keheliya Rambukwella was in February for alleged complicity in the procurement of substandard medicines.

The NPP needs to move quickly and set the tone to gain momentum. They need to plan executive actions, focused on finances and personnel, with the aim of introducing new legislation while delivering on campaign promises. This includes rolling back the anti-democratic policies of the previous president, particularly to protect freedom of speech and association.

Political appointments need to be made, while building an essential network of civil servants. This is important not only for implementing domestic policies, but negotiating with key trading partners, such as India, China, the United States, the European Union and Japan. These external relations will also determine debt restructuring efforts, while enabling room to manoeuvre on domestic policies, particularly strengthening social protections.

The NPP also needs a broad strategy to communicate its appointments, programs and policies with the media and the general public. The media is dominated by clientelist relations with traditional (ethno-nationalist bourgeois) parties.

It is an exciting new beginning with many challenges for progressive forces. Encouraging democratic discussion and strengthening democratic social movements will be imperative to build on this sliver of hope for “system change”.