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Pavel Kudyukin is co-chair of the University Solidarity trade union and a member of the Council of the (KTR). �鶹��ý’s Federico Fuentes and Serhii Shlyapnikov spoke to Kudyukin about the situation of workers and trade unions in Russia.

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Could you describe the situation for workers today in Russia?

It is important to note that a significant differentiation in wage levels has occurred. Salaries have mostly increased at military enterprises, given the need to attract workers to those jobs. Non-military enterprises facing greater competition for labour have also tried raising wages to attract workers, though not all have succeeded.

But wages for a significant portion of workers are stagnating and falling behind price rises. Also, the gap between the average and the median wage — the one that divides earners into two equal halves — is widening.

In the public sector, wages are falling significantly behind. Funding for publicly owned industries has either stagnated or declined in nominal and real terms. The so-called May Decrees of 2012, which sought to align wages in education, science, healthcare and culture with regional averages, are no longer being implemented.

Is the war driving these price rises? Do workers see the connection between the two?

Inflation is being driven by rising prices in the military sector and industries closely tied to the military-industrial complex. However, most people do not associate inflation, which concerns them deeply, with the war.

Does this mean that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal of keeping the population relatively indifferent to the war has been successful?

Currently, people either try not to think about the war or, to some extent, repeat official propaganda. Some believe that while the war may have been a mistake, now that it has started it must continue.

However, there is a growing sentiment — though difficult to measure precisely — among people that the war needs to end as soon as possible.

These people do not necessarily care how it ends: whether through Ukraine’s capitulation or an abrupt declaration by the Russian leadership that all objectives have been achieved. They would likely greet any resolution with relief.

What has the war meant for workers’ rights?

The war has been used to restrict labour rights at enterprises involved in the war effort. Most notably, restrictions on overtime work have been lifted.

Legally, this is absurd, as the government decree contradicts the Labour Code, which sets specific limits on overtime. But this is something that happens in Russia: formally, the law takes precedence; but if needed, government decrees override laws.

Entrepreneurs, particularly those from the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, are taking advantage of this. They are lobbying to raise the permissible amount of overtime work, citing labour shortages.

Indeed, there is a labour shortage, though it is uneven across different economic sectors. But just because there is a labour shortage does not mean that any person can easily find a job — there is often a mismatch between people’s qualifications and what enterprises need.

What other challenges do workers face in organising under wartime conditions?

There are very severe restrictions on the opportunities for collective action. Even an “Italian” strike [a commonly used term in Russia for a work-to-rule strike], which is a classic way to bypass legal restrictions on strikes, is practically impossible under Russian legislation.

If we carefully examine the Labour Code, we can see that legally holding a strike is nearly impossible. Italian-style strikes by healthcare workers and some industrial enterprises have been relatively successful in the past. Now, however, they face resistance.

The opportunities for such actions have practically disappeared since 2020, when anti-COVID restrictions on street protests were introduced. Even solo pickets lead to detentions and administrative penalties, despite the law allowing for such actions.

This significantly limits the possibilities for trade union activity. When a union cannot organise a strike or a rally, its options for action become very limited.

In some cases, unions manage to participate in collective bargaining and secure improvements in their collective agreements. The problem is that most independent unions are minority unions, meaning they have limited influence in collective bargaining.

However, medical unions, Novoprof [New Trade Union, which unites workers from the service and food sector], and University Solidarity have had some success in making small improvements to working conditions through collective agreements.

But in general, given rising police repression that authorities justify as due to the war, trade union activity is extremely restricted. Large-scale actions that could change this trend are not something most workers are ready for at the moment.

We also know of many cases of trade unionists being jailed. Is there a growing sense that solidarity itself is now seen as dangerous?

Yes, absolutely. Collective actions — even when they are purely economic in nature — are perceived as highly disloyal to the authorities.

However, there are still occasional surges of activity. There are some legal loopholes, for example, that allow protests related to wage arrears or in specific sectors such as delivery work, where people are not employed under formal labour contracts. Paradoxically, this frees them from Labour Code restrictions.

What about the situation of workers in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine?

Unfortunately, these territories remain a kind of terra incognita for labour rights and economic conditions. It is unclear how employment functions there. It is not even clear who is currently working there or in what conditions, as much of the infrastructure is in ruins.

Moreover, a large part of the male population has been conscripted, even before the full-scale invasion started. In the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk that were under Russian control before 2022, there was a general mobilisation that removed many men from the workforce.

The latest data suggests that combat losses among these conscripts are above average.

The two main Russian trade union federations, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) and the KTR, reacted differently to the war. How do their responses compare?

FNPR, true to form, displayed full loyalty to the government and actively supported the war. Their 2022 May Day celebrations were disgracefully held under the “Z” symbol [which is used in government war propaganda], thereby turning a day of workers’ solidarity into a symbol of war and aggression.

Many FNPR-affiliated unions actively participate in war-related fundraising and military events.

KTR, on the other hand, immediately after the full-scale invasion. The statement was cautious in its wording, mainly expressing concern that the war would worsen workers’ conditions and damage traditional ties between Russians and Ukrainians.

For May 1, 2022, KTR adopted the slogan “Solidarity is stronger than hatred”, which represented a subtle but clearly oppositional stance to the war.

But after its initial statement, KTR has mostly remained silent, avoiding public comments on the war.

Among grassroots unions, the [Interregional Trade Union] Workers Association (MPRA), which represents industrial workers, has a membership that is largely neutral or only mildly pro-war.

The teachers’ union did not issue an official statement because some local branches threatened to leave if it did, but individual council members initiated a petition signed by several thousand educators in the first days of the war.

University Solidarity, which represents higher education workers, twice issued explicitly anti-war statements. The second statement, after the announcement of partial mobilisation in September 2022, openly called on people not to participate in the war.

The union, along with legal experts, held webinars on how to legally avoid mobilisation. This was important work.

Most other unions, however, have remained silent — though silence itself requires courage in Russia, as it is understood as dissent.

Have anti-war trade unions had any success establishing connections with unions in Ukraine? We know that Ukrainian trade unions are due to its pro-war stance. What is your opinion?

FNPR voluntarily left the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) under the threat of expulsion, though FNPR-affiliated unions remain members of some global trade union federations.

The problem, unfortunately, is that our Ukrainian colleagues are demanding the exclusion not only of the FNPR but of all Russian trade unions. This is not a reasonable stance.

It is understandable why Ukrainian unions take this position — it is psychologically justified. But politically, it is not a very wise strategy. It is in the best interest of Ukrainian workers to maintain contact with independent Russian unions that do not support the war.

As for connections with Ukrainian colleagues, these remain but on a personal level. I have an old friend from Kryvyi Rih, and we have remained in contact without conflict. There are other Ukrainian comrades as well that we talk with. However, these are personal rather than institutional connections.