By Wang Dan
On July 14, 1994, all the major newspapers in Beijing published the "Detailed Implementations Regulations for the State Security Law." This law had been passed by the 13th session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on February 22, 1993.
In Article Seven of Chapter One of the Regulations, activities of colluding to effect actual harm to state security (mentioned in Article Four of the State Security Law) are defined.
The actions listed are: "1) Plotting or carrying out activities for endangering state security together with organisations, institutions or individuals outside the country; 2) Accepting the financial support of organisations, institutions or individuals outside the country, or doing so at their instigation, to carry out activities which endanger state security; and 3) Establishing ties with organisations, institutions or individuals outside the country, and obtaining their support and assistance for carrying out activities which endanger state security."
The "organisations, institutions or individuals outside the country" are not qualified as only those which are "antagonistic". Therefore all contacts and communications between democracy movement activists and organisations within China and overseas can be included in the scope of this item.
Some mainland democracy movement activists try to avoid involvement with the overseas-based Chinese Alliance for Democracy or the Front for a Democratic China, since both have been identified by the government as "reactionary organisations." But the formulation in the regulations makes this pointless, since if the government determines that your activities "are harmful to state security", having "contacts" outside the country can constitute the crime of "colluding" with them.
Article Eight of the regulations outlines the clearest and most restrictive controls yet on dissidents in China. The regulations designate various actions listed below as the "other destructive activities which harm state security" mentioned in Article Four of the State Security Law. The regulations list six types, of which the following are the most noteworthy:
"(2) Fabricating or distorting facts, publishing or disseminating written or verbal comments, or producing or propagating audio and video products which endanger state security", is clearly targeted at people who give interviews to foreign reporters or publish articles overseas.
"(3) Carrying out activities which endanger state security through establishing social organisations or enterprise or business institutions" provides a legal excuse to repress or persecute dissident groups like the League for the Protection of the Rights of Working People of the PRC, founded by Yuan Hongbing and others. "Enterprise or business institutions" are terms not previously used, demonstrating that the Chinese authorities are alert to the fact that dissidents are increasingly "plunging into the sea" by engaging in commerce.
"(6) Activities of individuals outside the country who violate relevant regulations, disregard persuasion and meet with people inside the country who have endangered state security, or who are seriously suspected of endangering state security." This last item is very serious. It essentially cuts off the possibility of any contact between democracy activists living in China and those abroad, since no legal process is required to decide that someone is under suspicion; the relevant government departments can make such a determination at will. These agencies can arbitrarily ban anyone from abroad from having contact with any person they wish. Ignoring this ban would mean you have "endangered state security".
These Detailed Implementation Regulations are supposed to be practical interpretations of the State Security Law, but the basic premise behind the idea of such a definition is that repeating the concept does not provide a sufficient explanation. When it comes to the practical explanation of the concept we would all most like to see defined, namely "endangering state security", the definitions provided are nothing but tautologies.
For instance, actions defined in the regulations as "harmful to state security" include giving speeches and producing writings which harm state security. Thus a clear definition of what is harmful to state security is not given in either the State Security Law itself or in the Detailed Implementation Regulations for it. This makes it very easy to carry out what is essentially "rule by man" in the process of law enforcement and to make the laws and regulations not worth the paper they are written on.
Another cause for concern is Article 24 of the regulations, which states: "He who refuses to provide information — when evidence proves that he knows other people have committed the crime of endangering state security, or when state security organs are questioning him about the situation and collecting evidence after having been informed that other people have committed the crime of endangering state security — shall be handled in accordance with Article 26 of the 'State Security Law'".
The punishments authorised under Article 26 include administrative discipline, administrative detention of up to 15 days and up to 10 years' fixed term imprisonment. Thus once the relevant government departments inform you that someone has engaged in activities harmful to state security, you are obliged to provide evidence, or you yourself will be sent to prison.
The regulations do not mention whether the authorities are required to reveal the evidence they have when they "clearly inform" you about the alleged crime. Does this not mean that government departments can arbitrarily require citizens to provide information about others?
It is clear that the new regulations are aimed entirely at what the government calls "factors causing instability" — their major target is the dissidents. When these dissidents publish articles, accept interviews, meet with people from abroad or "plunge into the sea" by going into business, they have to guard against their activities being labelled as "harmful to state security".
In view of the scope of this law, every move dissidents make is like walking on extremely thin ice; any action at all can bring heavy consequences. How can the work of promoting human rights and democracy be performed under such conditions? In past decades, the government has passed numerous laws and regulations aimed at suppressing its political opponents. But the Detailed Implementation Regulations are the clearest in their political objective, the broadest in the scope of their restrictions and the severest in their degree of control.
Since the beginning of this year, the government has adopted a repressive policy towards dissidents as a group. Wei Jingsheng, Yuan Hongbing, Zhou Guoqiang and others are still being deprived of their personal freedom, while 15 dissidents who have been in detention for over two years, including Hu Shigen and Chen Wei, were prosecuted in a group trial for "counter-revolutionary crimes". (No verdict has yet been announced.)
I have been living under 24-hour surveillance and am constantly followed. So the Detailed Implementation Regulations have given the authorities legal justification for these repressive actions, making the suppression of dissent appear to be legitimate in policy and law.
Unless there are major changes in the political situation of the CCP, the conditions under which Chinese dissidents exist can only get worse, while the scope for political action becomes ever narrower. As the contradictions in society accumulate and sharpen, the use of such repressive measures is not only unreasonable but also harmful.
When all the channels available for the expression of political opposition in open, legal fashion are closed, political forces which already exist will be forced to participate politically in secret and illegal ways. In terms of social stability and progress, the disadvantages of this greatly outweigh any possible benefits. The effects on the proper process of democratisation in Chinese society will be severe. [Wang Dan spent three and a half years in prison for his role as a leader of the 1989 student movement. Since his release, Wang has continued his advocacy of democracy and human rights, despite repeated arrests and heavy surveillance. This article was translated by Che Shaoming. Abridged from China Rights Forum.]