By Boris Kagarlitsky
MOSCOW — Following the Eighth Congress of People's Deputies, it became clear that the political situation in Russia had changed irreversibly. The growing opposition to Yeltsin on the part of the deputies reflected the general disappointment with the results of neo-liberal reforms. At the Eighth Congress the government met defeat not at the hands of Communists, but of those forces which in 1990 and 1991 had ensured Yeltsin's victory over the Communists.
The conflict between the executive and legislative powers, and the crossing into opposition of the leaders of the Civic Union, of democrat-patriots, of moderate leftists, of trade union activists and of large numbers of enterprise managers bore witness to the new relationship of forces.
A rapid demarcation of interests has begun. Important social forces which in 1991 supported Yeltsin's rise to power discovered in 1992 that the course of reform that had been adopted did not correspond to their interests.
The government failed to meet them halfway, not only because it was unwilling to do so, but also because the country still lacked democratic mechanisms of power; the backward linkages in the system of rule failed to work in practice, while it was impossible to form political coalitions due to the weakness of the political parties and the absence of a real parliament.
Throughout 1990 and 1991 a bitter internal struggle raged within the Democratic Russia bloc, the participants themselves in many cases only half understanding the real meaning of their differences.
The liberal "Westernisers", having gained the upper hand, sought mechanistically to introduce their own line, as if what was involved were policies approved by all the participants in the bloc. The result of ignoring the differences and refusing to alter the policies was to create an avalanche of contradictions. Unwilling to make concessions to society, Yeltsin and his circle finished up increasingly isolated.
Khasbulatov's concluding speech at the Eighth Congress served as a sort of manifesto for the new bloc of forces now coming to power in Russia. Khasbulatov spoke, but the voice was that of thousands of "serious people" waiting for their hour to arrive.
These people are directors of state enterprises, trade union leaders, technocrats and members of the professions. This new "corporate" elite has no wish to hand the country over to be plundered by the comprador capitalists, foreign bankers, speculators and mafiosi who stand behind the Russian clones of the "Chicago boys".
The leaders of the "industrial lobby" would prefer to take power with the help of parliamentary manoeuvres, and as far as possible they seek to avoid drawing the masses into the struggle. They also oppose concessions to the left forces and efforts to bring the trade unions into a leading role. But the "industrialists" have not been able to oust the "compradors" through behind-the-scenes intrigues. The Yeltsin team has continued to cling to power.
The Eighth Congress curtailed Yeltsin's power, but did not force the issue to its conclusion. The Congress proclaimed the right of parliament to control the government, but failed to devise a mechanism for imposing control. It created the constitutional possibility of impeachment, but did not put this threat into effect. It demanded that television and radio be placed under the control of the parliament, but limited itself to declarations.
To talk about a "congressional dictatorship" is absurd. Consisting of various fractions and groups, the Congress is totally incapable of imposing a dictatorship. Placing the television under parliamentary control would put an end to the propaganda monopoly of the Yeltsinites, by providing access for representatives of all currents. The president and his aides fear this even more than early elections. The monopoly on television propaganda is their only serious weapon in the political struggle.
The ambiguous outcome of the Eighth Congress created a situation of dual power. There could be only two ways out of this situation. Either force would be used — in the form of civil war, a military coup d'etat or a state of emergency — or else there would be new elections. The only factor preventing such elections was the position taken by the Russian deputies. They understood perfectly that after rejecting Yeltsin and his supporters, the voters would also reject many of his parliamentary opponents.
While the Eighth Congress was in session, rumours of an impending coup were already circulating in Moscow. What was involved was not simply leaks of information, though the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta later published a draft decree already signed by Yeltsin. Everyone simply understood that without a state of emergency, Yeltsin would not be able to hold on to power.
In Moscow on March 18 an "assembly of the intelligentsia" was held, with presidential press secretary Kostikov taking part. Speakers called for the "experience of Chile" to be put to use, and for all the regime's opponents to be sent "to the Luzhniki stadium". The government press and television openly discussed plans for "direct presidential rule" and a "state of emergency".
Two days later Yeltsin appeared on television, but did not declare the promised presidential rule. Instead, "special rule" was declared, together with a referendum on confidence in the president to take the place of elections. During a "period of transition", decrees by the president were to have the force of law. The Supreme Soviet was not dissolved, but Yeltsin unilaterally revoked its right to countermand decrees and pass laws contradicting his decisions.
All this took place at the very moment when the Supreme Soviet, acting on the instructions of the Eighth Congress, was preparing a draft electoral law and amendments to the constitution that would allow early elections for the president and parliament.
The counter-blow followed instantly. Within an hour of Yeltsin's television appearance, president of the Constitutional Court Zorkin, Vice-President Rutskoi and deputy speaker of the Supreme Soviet Voronin arrived at the television station. Another hour passed before they could get on the air. Finally, after midnight, they managed to deliver their appeal to the viewers.
What then ensued is inexplicable in terms of political analysis. Yeltsin went into hiding. His promised decrees were not published the next day, or on the Monday, or even on the Tuesday, when the official government newspapers were due to come out. The president was acting like the schoolboy who tears out of his exercise book the page containing a sum he has got wrong. Instead of acting, Yeltsin and his aides were rewriting their own decrees. When the decrees were finally published on the Thursday, virtually nothing of what Yeltsin had said on television remained.
The Supreme Soviet, which had not received the texts of the decrees, remained in confusion. The English word "impeachment" flashed across the pages of the newspapers. But in order to impeach the president, the parliament needed at a minimum to obtain the texts of the decrees. And there were no texts.
The state apparatus promptly organised demonstrations in support of Yeltsin, coordinated by state television. Nevertheless, the supporters of the "popularly elected president" failed to bring decisive numbers of people onto the streets. Yeltsin's
admirers barely outnumbered the opposing forces of the Communist "Toiling Russia" bloc. Most of the population maintained a sullen, contemptuous silence. They perceived both the president and his Communist adversaries as dangerous extremists who needed to be got rid of — the sooner the better.
When the Ninth Congress opened on March 26, it was clear that a motion of impeachment would not pass, and it also appeared that Yeltsin had no chance of avoiding elections either. The deputies' fear of a coup against the constitution outweighed their fear of the voters. Instead of waiting until June as they had planned at the Eighth Congress, the deputies preferred to decide everything without delay.
Sensing the danger, Yeltsin once again ate his words and began urging the deputies to forgive and forget. After the Congress suggested that the question of early elections be put to a popular vote, the president's side unexpectedly offered to drop the call for a referendum.
On the morning of March 27, deputies affirmed, Yeltsin appeared at the Congress distinctly the worse for alcohol, and delivered the first honest speech of his entire presidential career. This speech aroused sympathy in the hall, but it came too late. The question of elections had virtually been decided.
On the morning of March 28, Khasbulatov read out the draft of an agreement under which Yeltsin dropped his call for a referendum and agreed to simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections, to be held on November 21. Everything seemed to have been settled, but then the congress staged an unexpected revolt.
The drafters of the agreement had forgotten to clear it with the fractions and regional delegations. The offended deputies rejected the agreement, and went on to demand that Khasbulatov be sacked and Yeltsin impeached. Naturally, neither result came to pass, and in the meantime Yeltsin withdrew his consent to the agreement. The country was back where it had started.
[Abridged from Solidarnost. Translated for Â鶹´«Ã½ by Renfrey Clarke.]