By Norm Dixon
United States and British warplanes are launching multiple air attacks every day against targets in northern and southern Iraq. Had US rockets not slammed into a working-class Basra neighbourhood and a village on January 25, coverage of the latest escalation of the US war against Iraq might have remained confined to the "news briefs" Â鶹´«Ã½ of the daily press.
At least one of the US military's "precision-guided" missiles struck the neighbourhood of al-Jumhuriya, some 25 kilometres from the target the US claimed it aimed at. Missiles also hit Abu Falous village, outside Basra.
The results of an investigation into the attack by the United Nations' humanitarian coordinator in Baghdad, Hans von Sponeck, was leaked to the media on February 5. According to von Sponeck, the missiles killed 17 people, including 10 children, wounded 100 more and destroyed 45 houses. Washington admitted "stray" missiles hit al-Jumhuriya but has said nothing about Abu Falous.
The US claims its daily air raids are in response to "provocations" by Iraqi military aircraft and personnel — such as flying in their own airspace and detecting intruding warplanes with radar!
"We're acting here in self-defence and in response to concerted attacks by Saddam Hussein", declared Sandy Berger, US President Bill Clinton's national security adviser on January 26. In the vast majority of several dozen US missile attacks since December, the only "threat" cited by the US was that its warplanes had been "illuminated" or "targeted" by radar, or that air defence systems were "activated".
The US is well aware that Iraq's opposition to the "no-fly zones" can only be symbolic in the face of the 200 state-of-the-art US and British warplanes that patrol the zones from bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. Very few US or British war planes have been fired upon; none have been hit.
Berger revealed on January 26 that the US had granted its pilots carte blanche to strike any Iraqi air defence facility, even if it does not directly threaten US aircraft.
Berger described these "more expansive rules of engagement": "Our pilots understand and our air force understands that if there are violations, our response will not simply be against the particular source of the violation or source of the threat. But, as appropriate, [it] will be against any of the air defence systems that we think makes us vulnerable."
The US took this policy one step further on February 2 when four navy jets bombed an Iraqi shore-to-ship missile launcher and radar. The US said the missile battery was a "potential threat to oil shipping off coastal Kuwait". The US did not even bother to claim its planes had been "illuminated", "targeted" or fired upon to justify the attack.
Under the cover of maintaining no-fly zones, the US has launched a systematic offensive to guarantee US and British air superiority over decisive parts of Iraq. On February 4, US officials boasted that in the previous five weeks, US and British warplanes had destroyed 20% of Iraq's air defences — more than were taken out during the December bombardment.
The real goal of the attacks is to encourage Â鶹´«Ã½ of the Iraqi military that may attempt a military coup against Hussein's government.
Two-track policy
The US government is conducting a seemingly contradictory two-track policy towards the forces opposed to the Iraqi dictator. The first is to offer financial and military support to the myriad of discredited and ineffective "opposition" groups based in London, Teheran and Iraqi Kurdistan (northern Iraq).
The Clinton administration reluctantly adopted this policy late last year when the president signed the Republican-sponsored Iraq Liberation Act. This set aside US$97 million in military aid to be directed to opposition groups. Clinton's main reason for signing the legislation was to try to appease the Republicans, who were baying for his blood over the "zippergate" scandal.
Washington also figured that loudly announcing the availability of aid for forces it could portray as "democrats" would be a useful facade behind which it could pursue its favoured policy of replacing one dictator with another, albeit pro-imperialist, dictator.
Washington's real policy was plainly stated by the commander of US forces in the Persian Gulf region on January 28. Speaking before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, General Anthony Zinni cast doubt on the opposition groups' ability to work together or overthrow Hussein. He suggested that a weak Hussein would be preferable to Iraq's fractured opposition groups taking power.
"I don't see an opposition group that has the viability to overthrow Saddam at this point ... Even if we had Saddam gone, we could end up with 15, 20 or 90 groups competing for power", Zinni said. "Saddam should go, there's not a doubt in my mind. But it is possible to create a situation that could be worse. That's my concern.
"I've seen the effect of regime changes that didn't quite come about the way we would have liked", Zinni continued. "And the last thing we need is another rogue state. The last thing we need is a disintegrated, fragmented Iraq because the effects on the region would be far greater, in my mind, than a contained Saddam."
State Department spokesperson James Foley on January 29 said there was no contradiction between Zinni's statements and Washington's dealings with the opposition groups. Foley said that he endorsed Zinni's view that the opposition was no immediate threat to Hussein and the decision to fund and arm the groups was at the Clinton administration's discretion. "No decisions have been made in that regard", Foley added.
Opposition groups
In late January, Washington identified seven groups eligible for funding under the Iraq Liberation Act and appointed Frank Ricciardone to liaise with them and the pro-imperialist regimes in the region.
The only groups on the list with military capability are Iran-backed Shi'ite Muslim groups in the south and two conservative Kurdish groups in the north — bitter enemies of each other — led by corrupt warlords who have few qualms about dealing with the anti-Kurdish regimes of Turkey and Iran — and even Iraq — for short-term gains.
Iraq's Arab neighbours are opposed to a Shi'ite enclave, backed by Iran, being established in Iraq. Likewise, Turkey is against an autonomous Kurdish enclave in Iraq — regardless of how cravenly pro-imperialist its leaders may be — for fear that it will encourage Turkey's oppressed Kurdish population to break away.
Zinni's opposition to a "disintegrated, fragmented Iraq" indicates that the US shares these concerns, while not being averse to making use of opposition groups in the short term to weaken Baghdad and perhaps link up with a military coup should that take place.
The London-based Iraqi National Congress, which hopes to receive US funding to train 8000 fighters in the south and advocates that the southern no-fly zone become a "no-drive" zone enforced by US firepower, on February 2 expressed disappointment at Zinni's public statements. The INC said Washington is continuing to focus on covert attempts to organise a military coup "rather than work with the opposition for democratic change".
Coup attempt?
Evidence has emerged that suggests the US bombardment of Iraq in December may have been timed to coincide with such a coup attempt. The January 1 edition of the London-based Al-Hayat reported that immediately prior to and during the blitz, senior officers of the Iraqi army's southern-based 3rd Corps were executed.
The newspaper also reported that armed clashes took place on December 18 at the Rashid army camp in Baghdad, followed by the execution of five officers. A group of officers of the 11th Mechanised Division, part of the 3rd Corps, were also executed.
On December 19, Agence France Presse, quoting the underground Iraqi Communist Party, reported that two colonels were executed in Baghdad's Taji barracks. One was from southern Iraq, the other was from the air force in Hussein's own power base of Tikrit.
Deutsche Presse Agentur reported on December 18 that heavy weapons, ammunition and equipment were seen being transported through Kuwait toward Iraq on December 17 and 18. Kuwaiti eyewitnesses reported that convoys of US trucks, escorted by US and Kuwaiti forces, carried at least 31 tanks toward the border. The US refused to comment of the report.
The Iranian news agency IRNA reported that US and British forces crossed five kilometres into Iraq from Saudi territory on the night of December 18 before withdrawing.
During the bombardment, the US targeted those Â鶹´«Ã½ of the Iraqi military considered most loyal to Hussein: the intelligence services; the Republican Guard, which "shadows" the regular army divisions; and the elite 25,000-strong Special Republican Guard, the regime's last line of defence.
US and British attacks were concentrated in southern Iraq. The US also attempted to sever the south from Baghdad by destroying communication links. US warplanes showered Iraqi troops in southern Iraq with leaflets that said "only those units that support the Baghdad regime" were being attacked.