By Boris Kagarlitsky
MOSCOW — The dramatic worsening of President Boris Yeltsin's health has caused the crisis of power to intensify. When an autocrat is sick, sharp struggles break out in the ruler's entourage. Every grouping tries to seize and hold the strongest positions it can.
The leaders of Russia's Communists are no exception. The yearning of the Communists for access to power, together with fears that the parliament would be dissolved, determined how the parliamentary majority would act in mid-August when the question arose of whether to approve the proposed line-up of government ministers.
Viktor Chernomyrdin was confirmed as prime minister even before the government was formed; at that stage he had neither presented a program nor named his new cabinet.
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) head Gennady Zyuganov declared that the Communists did not support the government; then, after first securing a secret ballot, the Communists voted to confirm the government in office. Since this failed to arouse a crisis in the fraction, it is obvious that everything had been agreed beforehand. One of the leaders of the Communist movement, Aman Tuleev, entered the ministry.
The KPRF is increasingly discrediting itself. The creation by Zyuganov of the Popular Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR) represents an attempt to strengthen his leadership and to freeze the present relationship of forces within the opposition. As one parliamentary consultant put it, the Communists have again stepped on the same rake, this time not with their left foot but with their right one.
The NPSR, which is essentially the same coalition Zyuganov put together for the elections, will not lend the Communist Party new dynamism, put forward new ideas or present new faces. But creation of this bloc has served to increase the dependency of the KPRF on small, mainly nationalist groups; these formations received a disproportionate number of places in the NPSR leadership.
The outcome will be a further disorientation of the left electorate. Those who do not sympathise with the "democrats", but who see the current authorities as a defence against nationalism and a "return to the past", will continue to be repelled.
General Lebed, in turn, will do his utmost to strengthen his position in the "power ministries". The Defence Ministry is more or less under his control, but the same cannot be said of the Federal Security Service (the former KGB) or the Interior Ministry. This is the reason for the public squabbling between Lebed and his colleagues — not only over Chechnya, but also over the question of who stands where in the hierarchy. Meanwhile, Lebed needs to be seen acting boldly and taking difficult decisions.
Heads in the sand
When the Chechen resistance during August managed to seize all the large towns in the republic, routing or encircling the main forces of the Russian army in Grozny, the defeat suffered by the army was decisive. The earlier political and moral defeat suffered by the Russian forces was compounded by a total military debacle.
Russian society still has not acknowledged the scale and depth of the military defeat. This evasion has been aided both by the generals, who in order to save face are concealing the true state of affairs in the army, and by the "head of the Chechen government", Doku Zavgaev, still desperately clinging to his post.
In political circles, a pointless discussion has unfolded on whether Chechnya should be "let go". Since Moscow does not have the strength to hold on, the only point worth discussing is how to carry out the transfer of power in the republic, and how to conduct relations following the recognition of sovereignty.
Chernomyrdin, because of his huge personal stake in the oil and gas sector, and Yeltsin, for reasons of ideology, personality and corruption, will try to the last to prop up Zavgaev. As a result, the president and prime minister will become less and less capable of influencing the formula for a real settlement.
Lebed and the military leader of the Chechen resistance, Aslan Maskhadov, thus enjoy a definite advantage: they are the only major political figures who are plotting their moves on the basis of the real situation. Consequently, Lebed has been able virtually to ignore the Kremlin and to take decisions independently.
It is hard to believe that Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin understand as little about the situation in Chechnya as their actions and statements suggest; more likely, they have been locked by their personal interests into untenable positions. But the impression that they know nothing and can suggest nothing has greatly strengthened Lebed's position. At the same time, Lebed is forced to answer for all the drawbacks of the "normalisation" in Chechnya.
The decision to postpone deciding the status of Chechnya is the optimum for both sides. Devastated by the war, Chechnya cannot restore its economy in complete isolation from Russia. But after two years of conflict, the signing of any agreement providing for Chechnya to remain part of Russia, even on the most advantageous terms, would be perceived as treachery and would split the resistance.
The agreement that Chechnya's status will not finally be decided until the end of 2001 removes this contradiction. A transition period is beginning; while it runs its course, real power in Chechnya will be in the hands of the resistance. Finally, Maskhadov clearly envisages that in 2001 he will be dealing with a different Russian government.
Nationalist indignation
The truce in Chechnya has aroused a storm of indignation among Russian politicians and intellectuals with a fixation on their national state and its interests. Surprisingly, the left-liberal daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta has joined this camp. In a tactful and delicate manner, the paper explained to its readers that carrying out genocide against the Chechen people would be more humane than granting independence, which would lead to the disintegration of Russia and to a general spread of "Islamic fundamentalism".
The choir of hawks has also been joined by the leaders of the KPRF, who have forgotten the antiwar resolutions adopted by their own party. To be more precise, the Communist chiefs never took these resolutions seriously. A confidential directive of the party leaders has come to light; this banned KPRF bodies from carrying out the party's decisions on opposing the war.
Whatever the Russian "patriots" might write or declaim, the army has been defeated and Chechnya is free. Instead of swarming into Russia to spread "Islamic fundamentalism" (with which they are quite unfamiliar), yesterday's fighters are repairing water mains, restoring electricity supplies and apprehending bandits.
Meanwhile, Russia is living in expectation of an economic crisis. Inflation rates have fallen to record low levels (0% in August), but this has been accompanied by a rise of state and private indebtedness. The crisis of non-payments has grown more acute, and banks are continuing to shut their doors.
Even if the worst forecasts do not come to pass, there are no grounds for expecting an economic upturn in 1996. But however the dissatisfaction mounts, the demoralised and compromised leaders of the Communist Party cannot lead a movement of protest. Indeed, the evidence shows clearly that they have no wish to do so.