One month after Turkey鈥檚 June 7 parliamentary elections, the country still does not have a government. Ahmet Davutoglu of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) remains caretaker prime minister.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains the dominant figure in the AKP and is manoeuvring to retain his party鈥檚 leading position. The president is supposed to be an impartial figure above party politics but Erdogan pays scant regard to such constitutional niceties.
The elections were marked by two significant and related developments.
First, the left-wing People鈥檚 Democratic Party (HDP) smashed the undemocratic 10% threshold, achieving 13.1% (6.1 million votes) and 80 deputies in the 550-seat Grand National Assembly. While the HDP鈥檚 core support lies in the oppressed Kurdish community, the party reached out to all the oppressed and exploited across the country.
Second, the AKP dropped almost 9% from 2011 (4 million votes) and lost its parliamentary majority. A big factor in the AKP鈥檚 slide was the collapse of its vote in the Kurdish community. The two main elements here were Erdogan鈥檚 effective blockade of the Kurdish-majority northern Syrian town of Koban锚 last year when it was besieged by the Islamic State (IS) gangs, and his failure to seriously commit to the peace negotiations with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Other factors were widespread opposition to Erdogan鈥檚 desire to set up a dictatorial presidential system and popular concern over the worsening economic situation. A report by Bahcesehir University鈥檚 Centre for Economic and Social Research said two-thirds of Turkish children live in extreme poverty, according to European Union standards, the April 23, 2014, H眉rriyet Daily News said.
With 258 deputies, the AKP can now rule only in coalition with one of the other parties or with their support. The Republican People鈥檚 Party (CHP) has 132 deputies and the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has 80. So far a viable coalition has proved elusive.
According to the constitution, if no new government is formed within 45 days, fresh elections must be held.
A 鈥榬estoration鈥 government?
In theory, the three opposition parties could come together and form a 鈥渞estoration鈥 government to repeal and undo the worst of the AKP鈥檚 anti-democratic laws and practices.
However, such a government is impossible due to the MHP鈥檚 extreme anti-Kurd stance. It refuses to even talk to the HDP, let alone be in coalition with it or in a coalition dependent on its support. The MHP is also vehemently opposed to peace talks with the PKK.
On July 1 a new parliamentary speaker was elected. Despite its minority position, the AKP got its candidate up due to the backhanded support of the MHP. In fact, the AKP is politically closest to the MHP and an AKP-MHP coalition might be possible. However, each party is scared of losing supporters to the other and there is an ideological divide between the secular nationalist MHP and the Islamist AKP.
A coalition between the AKP and the CHP is a more remote possibility. The HDP has consistently ruled out any coalition with the AKP.
Fresh elections?
Erdogan is doubtless also weighing the option of going quickly to fresh elections. But unless he can create a new situation 鈥 such as a security 鈥渃risis鈥 involving the PKK or the Kurds over the border in northern Syria 鈥 a new election would be unlikely to deliver a majority for the AKP and might even make its position worse.
Furthermore, business wants stability. The June 29 Hurriyet Daily News said: 鈥淭urkish business circles want to see the end of post-election uncertainties and express their concerns to politicians. Many of them are under huge debt burdens. Their biggest concern is the possibility of the non-establishment of any coalition government and entering a snap election period, which will both increase political risks.鈥
Business groups also want the Kurdish peace process continued, the Hurriyet Daily News said.
Clearly, a resumption of the war between the PKK and the state would be an economic disaster for Turkey.
Erdogan desperate to keep power
Erdogan has been the dominant political figure in Turkey since 2003. He has been the driving force in establishing a very authoritarian, undemocratic and corrupt system. He has sought to bring all independent power centres under AKP control. A government not fully under the AKP鈥檚 control threatens all this.
A few examples illustrate the reality of AKP rule in Turkey:
鈥 A corruption scandal erupted in December 2013 as police investigations became public. It involved cabinet ministers, family members, senior state officials and businesspeople.
Tapes of phone conversations made at this time were later leaked revealing then-prime minister Erdogan instructing his son Bilal to 鈥渮ero鈥 (dispose of) huge sums of money stashed in various relatives鈥 houses for fear of raids by prosecutors.
Erdogan鈥檚 response was to label the whole thing a conspiracy by his former allies in the Islamic Hizmet movement of Fethullah G眉len to topple the government.
He launched a crackdown on supposed G眉len supporters, targeting thousands of police, prosecutors and judges across the country. In January, the AKP-dominated parliament voted not to lift the immunity of four ex-ministers implicated in the scandal.
However, both the CHP and MHP have called for the graft probe to be reinstated and for Erdogan鈥檚 son to be investigated. This will be an issue in any coalition negotiations.
鈥 In January 2014 gendarmerie officers stopped three trucks bound for Syria. The trucks were under the control of MIT (Turkish intelligence). Ostensibly carrying humanitarian supplies, they were found to be carrying weapons, presumably destined for Islamist forces. The government said the gendarmerie's action breached national security. Erdogan called the gendarmes 鈥渢raitors鈥. This year, four prosecutors and a gendarmerie colonel were arrested over the incident.
鈥 In June, B眉lent Kenes, an editor of the English-language Today鈥檚 Zaman, was given a 21-month suspended sentence for a tweet implying that Erdogan鈥檚 late mother would have been ashamed of her son. Many others have been charged with insulting Erdogan.
鈥 Previously, the nine-person board of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RT脺K), which oversees (censors) broadcast media, has been dominated by the AKP. Following the election it was expected that the AKP would lose its majority but it now wants to adopt a new method of filling the board positions which would allow it to retain control, the July 5 Today鈥檚 Zaman reported.
鈥 Lately the media in Australia has been focusing on mafia links to the major political parties. Such things are not unique to Australia. Erdogan was photographed chatting with leading crime figure Sedat Peker on June 13. The occasion was the wedding of notorious anti-Kurd hate propagandist Taha 脺n, who was marrying the personal secretary of Erdogan鈥檚 wife. Erdogan was an official witness at the wedding.
Preparing for war against the Kurds?
Initially many Kurds had high hopes for Erdogan and the AKP, but that is long gone. Erdogan has shelved the so-called settlement process with the PKK and the Kurds. He now denies there is a Kurdish issue.
For reasons of political survival, Erdogan appears to be stoking the fires of an anti-Kurd Turkish nationalism and trying to create a scare campaign around Kurdish gains in Rojava (the Kurdish-majority liberated zone in northern Syria).
There have even been reports that the army is giving military training to the Kurdish Hizbullah (H眉da-Par) organisation. This is an Islamist outfit that in the past has carried out armed attacks on the PKK. Is the state once more going to use Hizbullah to promote Kurd-on-Kurd violence? Recently a H眉da-Par leader in Dyarbakir was killed and then several HDP members were assassinated. These killings have all the hallmarks of an operation of the Turkish security forces.
The great June victory of the YPG/YPJ (Peoples Protection Forces/Women鈥檚 Protection Forces) and their Arab and Assyrian allies in liberating Gire Spi (Tel Abyad) and linking up Rojava鈥檚 Cezire and Koban锚 cantons has deeply disturbed the Turkish regime. It has accused liberation forces of 鈥渆thnic cleansing鈥 of Arabs and Turkmens and with promoting 鈥渄emographic changes鈥.
These charges are baseless. While the YPG/YPJ is predominantly Kurdish it includes many non-Kurdish elements. The Rojava charter, to which the YPG/YPJ scrupulously adhere, is all about different ethnic and religious groups cooperating, controlling their own affairs and living amicably together. In the territories between the cantons, Kurds are in the minority. Progress against IS forces in these areas is only possible on the basis of alliances, especially with Arab groups.
Some people fled Gire Spi prior to its liberation to escape the fighting. Many refugees are now returning.
Threat of intervention in Syria
Following the liberation of Gire Spi, Erdogan tried to promote a Turkish intervention in northern Syria, along a line from Jarablus westwards towards Efrin canton. Ostensibly aimed at the Islamic State, it鈥檚 real aim would have been to stop further advances by the YPG/YPJ. However, he met with a lot of opposition and this project now appears to be off the immediate agenda.
Turkey鈥檚 military command was unenthusiastic, most likely fearing a potential clash with Washington, which has conducted air strikes supporting YPG/YPJ actions against the Islamic State forces.
Furthermore, a caretaker Turkish government has no authority to undertake such an intervention, especially on such a contrived basis. The CHP has denounced any increased involvement in Syria. The public would be largely against it. It would have risked igniting the Kurdish population within Turkey.
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