BY EVA CHENG
The strains on Washington's close, seven-decade relationship with Saudi Arabia burst into the open last August when the Washington Post revealed that US war secretary Donald Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board (DPB) on July 10 had discussed a presentation, entitled "Taking Saudi out of Arabia". It declared that Saudi Arabia was "the kernel of evil" and urged Washington to forcibly take over its oil fields and other assets.
Though US President George Bush's administration, including Rumsfeld, swiftly distanced itself from the views expressed at the DPB meeting, the cracks in the Washington-Riyadh relationship have become even more evident.
On March 19, the day the US launched its war on Iraq, Saudi Arabia made clear in a formal statement, issued in the name of King Fahd, that the country "will not participate in any way" in a war against Iraq. On March 25, Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al Faysal warned against any foreign occupation of Iraq, stressing that Iraq was capable of managing its own affairs. On April 13, following the fall of Baghdad, Prince Saud reasserted "the importance of Iraqis re-establishing control over Iraq" and said his country will only deal with an Iraqi administration chosen by the Iraqi people.
These are hardly the kind of responses expected from a "close" ally. But rather than being the exception, differences like these have become a feature of the two countries' relationship in recent times, especially since the 9/11 attacks in the US.
The fact that 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers were Saudi Arabian nationals certainly made things worse, but it wasn't the only reason the relationship had begun to turn sour.
The hostility against Riyadh within the USA's ruling circles comes particularly from the network of so-called neo-conservatives, who have a major influence on Bush's foreign policies. For these right-wing neo-imperial ideologues, even the faithfully pro-US and dictatorial Saudi regime is too independent and too responsive to domestic opinion.
In his testimony to the House Committee on International Relations in May last year, William Kristol, chairperson of high-profile neo-con Project for the New American Century, pressed Washington to "develop strategic alternatives to reliance on Riyadh", pointing out that the USA's increasing military deployment in the Gulf states other than Saudi Arabia and growing purchases of oil from non-Saudi sources have been a good start.
Kristol continued: "In particular, removing the regime of Saddam Hussein ... would be a tremendous step toward reducing Saudi leverage. Bringing Iraqi oil fully into world markets would improve energy economics. From a military and strategic perspective, Iraq is more important than Saudi Arabia."
The real point of Bush's "war on Iraq" seems to emerge in Kristol's conclusion: "In sum, we should not be attempting to preserve our past relationship with Saudi Arabia but rather forging a new approach to the greater Middle East". This looks every bit like a scheme to shake up the power balance in the Middle East and the neighbouring regions with naked US might. Washington's control of Iraqi oil (which has the world's second-largest proven oil reserves) will no doubt sharply increase its lead as the world's super-hegemon.
In the same vein was Max Boot's article in the February 10 Weekly Standard, a neo-con mouthpiece: "Beyond Iraq loom other challenges — especially Syria and Iran, which have been waging undeclared war on the United States for 20 years, but also Saudi Arabia, which has abetted this war even as it has benefited from American protection. It is possible that a US victory in Iraq will intimidate these regimes into better behaviour. If not, the United States will have to take more vigorous steps to align our relationships with these countries."
Client state
How much influence does this neo-con perspective have on Bush's policies? Quite a lot, if the recent past is anything to go by. For instance, the notorious neo-con troika — Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith — have all assumed influential positions under Bush. Wolfowitz is the deputy secretary for defence. Perle was forced to resign as chairperson of the Pentagon's influential advisory club, the DPB, only a few weeks ago due to a conflict-of-interest scandal, but remains a member. Feith is undersecretary of defence and runs the DPB. The troika has been pushing for a new war on Iraq since the days of the administration of US President Bill Clinton.
With Hussein's regime gone, what will happen to Saudi Arabia? Not much, in terms of being a target of US military attacks. Syria, Iran, North Korea, Libya and other "rogue states" are much higher on Washington's hit list. However, in terms of its relationship with Riyadh, things have shifted in Washington's favour.
Washington has bent over backwards to accommodate Riyadh's wishes since the 1930s, when oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia and the rights to extract it were granted to US oil companies. Saudi Arabia's emergence as site of the world's largest oil reserves further increased its leverage because Washington, despite having significant oil reserves of its own, is also a big oil consumer. The US imports about half of its oil needs and this is projected to continue to mount.
Now with Iraq's oil virtually in its pocket, Washington can increasingly afford to play "hard ball" with the Saudi monarchy. This will not be good news to the House of Saud, the royal family which was able to secure its autocratic rule over Arabia (and name it after the family) after the country achieved statehood in 1932 — in no small measure due to US backing.
Israel has been Washington's top Middle East ally and partner since its formation in 1948. Until 1979 Washington also relied on two oil-rich client states — Iran and Saudi Arabia — to guard its interests in the Middle East. But Iran was lost to Washington when a massive popular uprising toppled the Shah in 1979. This development significantly increased Saudi Arabia's strategic importance in the region for Washington.
Due to widespread popular sympathy throughout the region with their fellow Arabs in Palestine, even cravenly pro-US Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia's have been forced to offer support — verbal and material — to the Palestinian people's struggle against Israeli occupation of their homeland.
The contradiction of being both pro-Palestinian and pro-US has long been a destabilising factor for the Saudi regime. It became explosive in October 1973, when the Saudi regime joined the oil embargo against the West, especially the US, in response to its backing of Israel in the Yom Kippur war.
Opposition grows
After closing its bases in Saudi Arabia in 1962, following a 15-year stint, the US did not have a military foothold in the country until the 1990-91 Gulf War. Washington has cooked up justifications since 1991 to retain these "temporary" bases and the thousands of US military personnel who staff them.
However, popular resentment to the US presence has grown, fuelling support for Islamist opponents of the corrupt Saudi ruling family (including none other than Osama bin Laden and his followers). This raised fears among some Â鶹´«Ã½ of the US ruling class that the Saudi regime could be overthrown by radical Islamists. US military facilities in Saudi Arabia were the target of major bombings in 1995 and 1996.
The second Palestinian intifada, which erupted in September 2000, and Israel's continuing brutal attempts to crush it, increased anti-US sentiment in Saudi Arabia. Anger boiled over in August 2001, prompting Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz, the country's de facto ruler since the king's debilitating stroke in 1995, to abruptly and unilaterally cancel a US-Saudi military review.
The February 10, 2002, Washington Post reported that Prince Abdullah had said he had had enough of the Washington's "100%" pro-Israel position. He declared that "from now on, we will protect our national interests, regardless of where America's interests lie in the region". Bush, according to the Post, quickly moved to repair the relationship.
Then came 9/11. What followed was an avalanche of anti-Saudi attacks in US Congress and the US media, accusing the country of being a terrorist-breeding ground. Washington's longstanding partnership with Saudi Arabia was put under severe scrutiny.
As part of their oil-for-protection deal, Washington had become Riyadh's top arms supplier, providing US$93.8 billion worth of weapons between 1950 and March 1997, and turned a blind eye to the blatant human rights violations carried out by the monarchy, which gives the fanatical Wahhabi Islamic sect de facto state religion status.
Despite the urging of his more extreme political allies, Bush has shown no signs of wanting to abandon the cosy long-term relationship between Washington and Riyadh. In March last year, just days after the Arab League adopted Prince Abdullah's peace proposal, which called for full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territories, Bush invited the prince to his Texas ranch for a chat.
Despite King Fahd's adamant declaration that Saudi Arabia would not participate in the war on Iraq "in any way", his country allowed US troops to use at least two of its airports. An April 3 brief for the US Congress noted that press reports "indicate that Saudi Arabia continues quietly to facilitate allied operations aimed against Iraq".
From Â鶹´«Ã½ Weekly, April 23, 2003.
Visit the