If anyone was expecting a new tilt, a flash of independence from foreign affairs minister Penny Wong鈥檚聽聽on April 17, they were bound to be disappointed.
The anti-China hawks 鈥 the United States State Department, the Pentagon and the Canberra establishment 鈥 got their fill.
In reading (and hearing) Wong鈥檚 speech, one must always assume the opposite, or something close to it.
Whatever is said about strategic balance, don鈥檛 believe a word of it. Occam鈥檚 Razor should apply: nothing said by any foreign policy official should ever be taken as independently聽verified. Best gaze across the Pacific for confirmation.
In Wong鈥檚 address, the ill-dressed clich茅 waltzes with the scantily clad platitude. 鈥淲hen Australians look out to the world, we see ourselves reflected in it 鈥 just as the world can see聽itself reflected in us.鈥
The basis for this strained nonsense is, at least, promising. Variety can, paradoxically, generate common ground.
鈥淭his is a powerful natural asset for building alignment, for articulating our determination to see the interests of all the world鈥檚 peoples upheld, alongside our own.鈥
Wong is mightily aspirational, although such language seems pinched from the Non-Aligned Movement of the Cold War, one that Australia, US deputy of the Asia-Pacific, was never a part of.
No informed listener would assume otherwise.聽Like a lecture losing steam early, she finally gets to the point of her address: 鈥淗ow聽[do]聽we avert war and maintain peace 鈥 and more than that, how [do] we shape a region that reflects our national interests and our shared regional interests.鈥
It does not take long to realise what this entails: talk about 鈥渞ules, standards and norms 鈥 where a larger country does not determine the fate of the smaller country, where each country can pursue its own aspirations, its own prosperity鈥.
That the US has determined the fate of Australia since World War II 鈥 manipulating, interfering and guiding its politics and policies 鈥 makes this statement risible, but no less significant.
We are on bullying terrain and Wong is trying to pick the most preferable bully. She can鈥檛 quite put it in those terms, so speaks about 鈥渢he regional balance of power鈥 instead, with Australia performing the role of handmaiden.
She dons the sage鈥檚 hat insisting that commentators and strategists have gotten it wrong to talk about 鈥済reat powers competing for primacy. They love a binary. And the appeal of a binary is obvious. Simple, clear choices. Black and white鈥.
It takes one, obviously, to know another, and Wong, along with Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, have shown little resistance to the very binary concept they supposedly repudiate.
Far from opposing it, their seduction by US power can be seen as a move towards the unitary: there is聽only聽one choice for Canberra.
Much of Wong鈥檚 speech seems trapped in this register. It rejects the 鈥減rism of great power鈥. It abhors the nature of great powers scrapping and squawking over territories.
And yet, Wong is keen to point the finger to one great power鈥檚 behaviour: unstainable lending, political interference, disinformation and reshaping international rules and standards. 鈥淐hina continues to modernise its military at a pace and scale not seen in the world for nearly a century with little transparency or assurance about its strategic intent,鈥 Wong states.
The premise of AUKUS is based around the US鈥櫬燿efence聽strategy: Washington鈥檚 defence budget聽聽of the next nine powers combined.
Wong did say a conflict over Taiwan 鈥渨ould be catastrophic for all鈥, but聽said nothing about how such a conflict could be averted.
Given the Anthony Albanese government has聽turned up its nose to war powers reform聽that would have given Parliament a greater say, confidence is hardly brimming.
Wong鈥檚 assessment of Australia鈥檚 role in international relations is also way off the mark. 鈥淲e deploy our own statecraft toward shaping a region that is open, stable and prosperous. A predictable region, operated by agreed rules, standards and laws. Where no country dominates, and no country is dominated. A region where sovereignty is respected, and all countries benefit from a strategic equilibrium.鈥
One is reminded of former Prime Minister Paul Keating, who聽聽Wong鈥檚 alms-for-the-poor routine as, 鈥渞unning around the Pacific Islands with a lei around your neck handing out money鈥.
This could hardly count as foreign policy.
鈥淚t鈥檚 a consular task. Foreign policy is what you do with the great powers: what you do with China, what you do with the United States,鈥 Keating said.
Much of Wong鈥檚 speech inhabits the realm of the speculative. She is delusionary in assuming that regional states will accept Australia鈥檚 observance of the Treaty of Rarotonga, whatever the stance taken by the AUKUS pact members. Otherwise known as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Wong revealed her ambivalence in observing its provisions.
She is on record as accepting the position that the US need not confirm whether nuclear-capable assets visiting Australia have nuclear weapons. She merely said that Washington 鈥渃onfirmed that the nuclear-powered submarines visiting Australia on rotation will be conventionally-armed鈥.
This hardly squares with the assessment of the Department of Trade and Foreign Affairs,聽聽that Australia will accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on its soil as long as they are not stationed.
The last word should be left to Keating. 鈥淲ong,鈥澛, 鈥渨ent on to eschew 鈥榖lack and white鈥 binary choices but then proceeded to make a choice herself 鈥 extolling the virtues of the United States, of it remaining 鈥榯he central power鈥 鈥 of 鈥榖alancing the region鈥, while disparaging China as 鈥榠ntent on being China鈥, going on to say 鈥榗ountries don鈥檛 want to live in a closed, hierarchical region, where rules are dictated by a single major power to suit its own interests鈥.
鈥淣othing too subtle about that.鈥
The Washington establishment will be delighted.
[Binoy Kampmark lectures at RMIT University.]