Adam Hanieh
RAMALLAH — On Sunday, March 29, I was sitting with some friends watching TV when a friend burst through the door inquiring whether we had heard about a bomb blast here. She had heard the news on BBC radio as she was travelling by taxi back to Ramallah from Gaza.
At first there was little news about the blast, which was assumed to be an industrial accident. However, the story soon evolved into a major event that reveals much about the current situation in Palestine, each day bringing a new version of a story that was soon lost in contradictions and invented lies.
The interest in this story heightened on April 2, when the Palestinian Authority (PA) announced that the body of Muhi a Din Sharif was found at the site of the explosion. Sharif was a prominent leader of Hamas' military wing — the Izz a Din Qassem brigade.
The PA said that the autopsy revealed that Sharif had not been killed in the blast but had died three hours earlier after being shot by two bullets in the chest and one in the leg.
The funeral of Sharif was attended by more than 20,000 people. The following day Ramallah lay silent as Hamas called a strike that was completely observed (much more so than most strikes here). Sporadic clashes erupted throughout the West Bank and Gaza, including a stand-off between Palestinian police and the Israeli army in Gaza — an event not witnessed since the Palestinian uprising of September 1996.
The surprising twist to this story came on April 6, when the head of the Palestinian Security Forces, Jibril Rajoub, held a press conference in Ramallah and announced, following an investigation, that five Hamas members had been responsible for the assassination.
The key confession had been obtained from Ghassan Adassi, a Birzeit University student who is a prominent Hamas leader on campus.
Palestinian Authority spokespeople were quick to reverse their original claims of Israeli culpability, and the Israeli government welcomed the findings as evidence that "the Palestinian Authority can fight terrorism".
However, evidence from other detainees and Adassi's family indicates that Adassi's confession was almost certainly extracted through torture.
On April 8, Hamas released a videotape in which the man claimed to have shot Sharif denied the accusation and called the Palestinian Authority and Israel jointly responsible for the murder. In the interview, Hamas called for worldwide attacks on Israel and Zionist targets.
The videotape, and indeed all comments from Hamas, have been tightly censored by the Palestinian Authority. While Israeli TV news broadcast the videotape in its entirety as the first news item, Palestinian TV did not even mention the tape and instead devoted an entire news broadcast to the various visits by Yasser Arafat on the occasion of the Islamic holiday Eid al Idhar.
Since then, more than 50 Hamas activists in the West Bank and Gaza have been arrested by the PA and held without charge. Meanwhile, the armed wing of Hamas has conducted its own investigation and accused Jibril Rajoub of Sharif's killing.
The situation has reached a critical point. If the conflict between Hamas and the PA results in the assassination of a PA leader such as Rajoub, then the situation would likely degenerate into inter-Palestinian armed conflict. Tribal and familiar loyalties would dominate such a conflict, resulting in the cleavage of the PA security bodies into little more than armed bands loyal to this or that particular leader.
While this story may make for a good murder mystery, its real significance lies much deeper. What it reveals are the very sharp divisions in Palestinian society, particularly between the PA and the vast mass of people whose living conditions have dramatically deteriorated following the signing of the Oslo accords.
Occupied territories
Since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, it has been examining possible scenarios for controlling the region. The guiding principle in this has been how to control the maximum area of land with the minimum Palestinian population.
A mass transfer of Palestinians — although supported by some Israeli political forces — would be impossible in the current situation. Direct military occupation was also not sustainable due to the significant solidarity shown with Palestinians during the intifada both from inside Israel and internationally.
The consensus of Israeli decision makers over the last 30 years has been to support some form of Palestinian autonomy in which Palestinians would live in isolated blocs, separated from each other by Israeli Jewish settlements and Israeli highways. In this way, the Palestinian population would be contained through checkpoints, ID cards and other means of identification (one example is the use of coloured number plates — Palestinians in the West Bank have blue number plates with each region identified, Israelis have yellow number plates).
Another key to preventing Palestinian sovereignty is the control of natural resources, without which it is impossible to develop an independent state. What is clear now, five years after Oslo I was signed, is that Israel has managed to virtually guarantee final control over close to 70% of the West Bank through the construction of settlements and bypass roads and demolition of Palestinian houses.
Settlement expansion
Whereas it took a full decade to increase the Jewish settler population in the occupied territories from 12,000 in 1979 to 75,000 in 1989, it took only five years to double that number to the 150,000 of today. The number of settlers has been growing by 10% each year since the signing of Oslo.
Between 1967 and 1977, the Israeli government, under the leadership of the Labour Party, unofficially followed what was known as the Allon Plan. This called for the construction of settlements in Jerusalem and along the Jordan Valley. These settlements were considered "security buffers" and divided the West Bank from Jordan.
During the mid-'80s, settlement construction focused on creating settlement corridors between Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley settlements and in the north of the West Bank, separating the two major Palestinian towns of Nablus and Ramallah from each other.
The result today is three large blocks of settlements that in effect divide the West Bank into three separate cantons.
These settlements are not "military outposts" or temporary housing units. They are major cities, with schools, shopping complexes, entertainment centres, linked by roads to Israel. They have become permanent fixtures of the landscape.
The two largest settlement blocks are Gush Etzion and Gush Adumim. Gush Etzion, south of Bethlehem, has a projected population of 35,000. Its size and the construction of roads linking it to Jerusalem, other settlements in the Jordan Valley and the Kiryat Arba settlement near Hebron divide the southern part of the West Bank, in particular the major Palestinian towns of Bethlehem and Hebron.
The Gush Adumim block, with a population of more than 20,000, is the largest settlement block in the West Bank. It links Jerusalem with settlements in the Jordan Valley.
A third block of settlements lying south-west of Nablus completes the division of the West Bank into three separate Palestinian cantons centring on Jenin and Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron.
The status of Jerusalem has already been determined through settlement construction that isolates the city from its West Bank hinterland. Jerusalem is important not only because of its cultural and religious symbolism to the Palestinian people, but also because it would be a key economic link in any future Palestinian state in the West Bank.
The Oslo II agreement, signed in September 1995, divided the West Bank into three areas: Area A, under the complete control of the PA; Area B, in which civil control would be in the hands of the PA and security in the hands of the Israeli military; and Area C, which would remain under Israeli control. Currently Area A consists of seven major Palestinian towns and covers about 3% of the West Bank, Area B constitutes about 27% and Area C the remaining 70%.
Oslo II also outlined plans for a second and third redeployment, after which final negotiations (Oslo III) would begin to decide the permanent status of the occupied territories, the question of Jewish settlements, the return of refugees and the status of Jerusalem. These final status negotiations were to begin no later than May 1996, yet neither the second nor third redeployment has taken place.
In the this context, violent protests occur regularly throughout the occupied territories. In mid-March, three Palestinians were shot dead by the Israeli military as they returned home from work in a public taxi. A few days after this shooting, an 11-year-old child was killed by a bullet to the head from an Israeli soldier.
In the clashes that ensued, more than 100 people were injured, including eight journalists who were shot at and seriously wounded — intentionally targeted by Israeli soldiers. On April 7, another Palestinian taxi driver was shot and killed.
In the face of these attacks, thousands of Palestinians from all areas and walks of life have faced the Israeli military with stones and slingshots. However these confrontations have been short-lived, rarely lasting more than one day.
The main reason for this is the response of the Palestinian Authority, which instead of supporting popular actions has preferred to call for the US to intervene and restart negotiations. This call became more vocal following the visit of US special envoy Dennis Ross to the region last month.
US proposal
The current US initiative calls for an Israeli redeployment from 13.1% of the West Bank, which will be transferred from Area C to Area A. The redeployment would be carried out in stages over 12 weeks, during which final status negotiations would begin.
Each stage would be conditional on the PA complying with certain requirements that essentially mean the deepening of the PA's authoritarian character through crushing all opposition to Oslo. For example, during the first stage of the redeployment (week 1 to week 5) the "PA will issue a presidential decree forbidding any type of incitement within the PA areas and a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee will be established to investigate instances of incitement".
Concurrently, a joint Israeli-US-Palestinian committee will investigate why police files on suspected terrorists were closed by the PA. In the second stage of the 12 weeks (week 6 to 11) the PA will submit to Israel a full list of the names of all Palestinian police.
While the PA is strongly encouraging the US to push ahead with its proposal, in reality the US plan includes all the main Israeli demands. Over the last year, the Israeli government has wanted to embark on final status negotiations before the completion of the scheduled redeployments. The redeployments would be a very strong bargaining chip during the negotiations, and Israel has laid all the groundwork to ensure the upper hand on all the outstanding issues.
It is important that the current US initiative does not demand a halt to Israeli settlement construction. According to the Hebrew press, Dennis Ross has concluded a deal with Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu which "as an investment in the peace process, would see a reduction but not a complete freeze in settlement construction". It would be up to Israel to determine the extent of this reduction.
For or against Oslo?
The question remains: is this situation a result of Oslo or a result of Oslo not being implemented? The Palestinian leadership believes that the latter is the case. However, an increasing consensus amongst activists is that the former lies closer to the truth. The main points in this argument can be summarised as follows:
- The primary mistake of Oslo was to postpone the fundamental issues in the Palestinian struggle (refugees, Jerusalem, settlements) to some later date while allowing Israel to continue actions that will determine the final status of any Palestinian territory.
- Oslo also legitimised the Israeli claim to the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the exact amount would be "determined through negotiations"). This was despite the fact that even the UN had recognised the occupation as illegal. The Oslo process removed all of Israel's obligations to leave the occupied territories.
- Oslo and accompanying agreements brought Israel in from the cold. Economic relations between Israel and Arab countries are proceeding at a very rapid rate, the boycott of Israeli products has virtually been lifted, and Israeli companies are rapidly exporting factories and capital to Jordan and Egypt to make use of cheap labour.
- Oslo also has led to an enormous schism between all sectors of the Palestinian community through reducing the Palestinian question to only those Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza — about 30% of the Palestinian people. This ignores the 1 million Palestinians who live inside Israel and the 3 million who live in exile (mostly in refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon).
The above four points relate concretely to the text of the Oslo agreements. The text itself is revealing — deliberately vague, contradictory and open to interpretation.
However, Oslo can't be understood from merely a textual analysis. More important is the effect on the Palestinian movement and the role of the Palestinian leadership in this process. Specifically:
- The Palestinian leadership has crushed any opposition to Oslo from the left and completely demobilised the Palestinian population. This was done primarily through imprisonment of activists (often in collaboration with the Israeli security services) and the refusal to mobilise people against the ongoing actions of the Israeli government.
- Arafat essentially dissolved the PLO and its structures, replacing it with the Palestinian Authority, dependent on Israel and the United States. The PA has been marked by endemic corruption in which ministers have become the agents of Israeli capital in the territories.
- Oslo has rapidly increased class polarisation through the development of a Palestinian bourgeoisie that has profited from the whole process. This has occurred at the same time as the impoverishment of most Palestinians. An ostentatious rich layer is apparent; US fast-food restaurants, expensive clothing shops and sky-rocketing rents prevail. At the same time, unemployment is at record levels, and the majority of Palestinians struggle to survive on a daily level.
- The increasingly sharp class differences have not met any response from the left. The major left parties — the Popular Front, Democratic Front and the Palestine People's Party (formerly the Communist Party) — have either become part of the PA or been absorbed into the movement of non-governmental organisations.
At every critical juncture, there has been no attempt by the Palestinian left to mobilise the population independently of the PA.
The Islamic movement has also been affected by an increasing division between political leaders who have gained positions within the PA and those in the military wing.
- As a result of the lack of any sustained political alternative, most ordinary Palestinians have retreated into attempts at individual solutions.
For a few, this means leaving the country to further careers abroad, but there are increasing signs of social decay amongst layers who have no other options.
This is particularly marked in Gaza, the poorest of all Palestinian areas, where over 40% of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories live. Last month, a baby was found buried alive in a refugee camp in Gaza, and in a separate incident a 15-year-old boy was arrested for the murder of a nine-year-old girl. Advertisements in Gazan newspapers promise easy money for the donation of body organs.
What the Sharif assassination and the response of the PA indicate is the increasing division between the population and the leadership.
The PA embarked on a direct attack on Hamas with the strong backing of Israel and the US. While Hamas remains a conservative political movement, it has gained in popular support because of the direction of the PA.
This is indicated by the enormous anger that followed Sharif's killing. A direct confrontation with Hamas is a very dangerous path for the PA to take, but one it will be forced to embark on more frequently if it wishes to continue with Oslo.