BY MAX LANE
JAKARTA — On the evening of January 15, senior Indonesian cabinet ministers announced the postponement of a proposed 22% increase in telephone charges and the postponement and review of proposed increases to electricity and petrol prices. The announcement followed two weeks of street protests and other expressions of opposition to the prices rises which had been announced on new year's day.
The plan to effect substantial price rises on telephone calls, electricity and petrol came at the end of a year in which President Megawati Sukarnoputri's government had implemented or presided over a host of unpopular decisions. These include, among many others, the continuing sackings of manufacturing workers and the deterioration in the market prices and distribution of agricultural commodities such as sugar and tobacco (imperiling the livelihoods of sugar and tobacco farmers and labourers) as well as price instability for rice.
There was also the outrageous case of presidential silence on the deportation from Malaysia of more than 200,000 Indonesian migrant workers and the absence of provision of basic amenities for these workers as they flooded back into overcrowded border towns.
Almost all opinion polls now show around 80% of respondents expressing some form of rejection of the government and the major political parties.
Protests target Megawati
While the protests and demonstrations of the last two weeks have not been large — peaking at about 15,000 on one or two occasions — they have manifested a number of features which mark the beginning of a qualitative change in the political situation.
First, the protests have taken place in almost all major cities from Medan in north Sumatra to Biak in West Papua.
Second, they have involved the broadest political support of any wave of demonstrations since 1997-98. Newspaper and TV reports show the presence in the protest actions of members of almost all political groups. However, the main Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Justice Party (PK), the Islamic Students Action Front (KAMMI), Hizbaz Tahir, Muslim Women in Solidarity with the Poor, provided the majority of the protesters in a majority of the major cities.
People organised by or associated with the revolutionary left People's Democratic Party (PRD), sometimes organised through coalitions called the Poor People's Front (FPRM), were the second consistent force mobilised in the recent protest actions. Also present were the full range of student groups, including coalitions of a new generation of campus activists.
On many occasions, several different trade unions and urban poor associations participated in the protests. Employer associations, especially of middle-sized companies, backed some demonstrations. Organisations of professionals, NGOs and former student activists also organised protest actions, or issued statements supporting the protests.
In East Java and the city of Palembang, at least, an important development has been the appearance of sizable contingents from the National Bung Karno Party (PNBK), which was formed in 2002 as a split from Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP).
The PNBK has tried to gather together discontented rank-and-file members of the PDIP, especially those members outraged by Megawati's refusal to take any action against those involved in the July 1996 attack on the PDI offices.
Even the opportunist parties of the elit politik (political elite) in the parliament "joined" the movement, calling on the government to "listen to the aspirations" of the people. These parties have, however, confined their specific suggestions to deferring the price rises. This was the concession made by the government on January 15.
A third feature of the demonstrations was that a majority of the protests have specifically targeted the Megawati government. Many of the protest groups adopted the PRD tactic of burning or disfiguring pictures of Megawati and her vice-president, Hamzah Haz. Despite complaints by Megawati that protesters were disfiguring "symbols of the nation" and some initial detentions of protesters, the practice has now spread far and wide. The police just looked on smiling.
There have been several clashes with the police as protesters have rocked the gates of the national parliament or occupied regional parliament buildings, other government buildings or regional radio or TV stations. In the central Sulawesi city of Palu, anti-government demonstrators burned down the local PDIP office after a small group of PDIP militia physically attacked some of the protesters.
Most of the protests have demanded the overthrow, or at least the resignation, of the Megawati-Hamzah Haz government. There have been equally as many calls for the whole parliament to resign along with the government.
Up until early January, the slogan "overthrow the Megawati-Hamzah Haz government" had been espoused only by the PRD. The sense of rejection of the government is now so obviously widespread that Megawati's rivals within the elite, such as People's Consultative Assembly chairperson Amien Rais, has even offered public support for a regime change involving extra-parliamentary action.
At a press conference on January 12, attended by employer and union leaders, radical labour leader and PRD member Dita Sari challenged Rais to indicate his attitude toward the extra-parliamentary movement demanding the ousting of the government. In front of a packed press conference, Rais manoeuvred to appear on side with the street movement.
It is also clear that the Islamic student groups with a fundamentalist or quasi-fundamentalist orientation have also opted to openly call for the overthrow of the government and the formation of a new government. These organisations have not only protested against the price rises, but also carried placards calling for the defeat of imperialism and the overthrow of capitalism. The same placards call for the implementation of Islamic law as the solution to the country's social and economic crisis.
Presidium
As the call for Megawati's resignation, or for her overthrow, has spread, so has discussion of what forces could replace the current government. There has been talk of the need for the formation of a "presidium" that can take over the government through extra-parliamentary mass action. The idea of a "presidium" first arose in 1998 in student circles.
At that time it was envisaged to comprise figures such as Megawati, Amien Rais, Abdurahman Wahid and other elite opposition figures to General Suharto's regime. Today, however, most of those raising the "presidium" idea are looking to opposition groups outside the leaders of the parliamentary parties to form such an alternative government.
On January 10, the chairperson of the PNBK, Eros Jarot, hosted a meeting of opposition groups and figures from outside the elit politik to discuss a strategy for replacing the Megawati government. Significant NGO figures, student activists, trade unionists and representatives of radical political groups attended or were invited to attend.
A manifesto for a "presidium" or new national opposition is currently being drafted and is expected to include a platform opposing subservience to the International Monetary Fund (which currently vets all major government budgetary decisions) and also advocating militant action against the remnants of Suharto's New Order regime, including the still untouched business conglomerates of the Suharto family and its cronies.
The broad composition of the protests has also highlighted the reality that a wide-ranging and substantial spectrum of organisations, action groups and individuals stand outside the influence of the elit politik and their parliamentary parties and may be willing to support such an anti-imperialist, democratic manifesto.
The call for the overthrow or, at least, the resignation of the Megawati-Hamzah Haz government has achieved a legitimate place on the political agenda. The main obstacle to the current wave of relatively small protests growing into a powerful mass movement able to challenge for state power is the absence of a credible, mass-based alternative pole of leadership with clear pro-worker, pro-peasant solutions to Indonesia's deepening economic crisis.
Whatever the specific outcome of the January 10 initiative, the idea of an alternative leadership based primarily on forces standing outside the existing pro-capitalist political elite is also now firmly on the political agenda.
With these developments, it is now increasingly uncertain whether the Megawati government will last until the 2004 elections or, if it does, whether Megawati will be in a position to stand again for the presidency. The embryo of an authoritative anti-imperialist, pro-democracy coalition is already taking shape in Indonesia. Once it is formed, it is likely that Indonesia will head directly into a state of mass rebellion against the Megawati government and the rest of the elit politik, whether channelled through elections or taking extra-parliamentary, "people's power" form.
From Â鶹´«Ã½ Weekly, January 22, 2003.
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