BY NGLINTING DARMONO
YOGYAKARTA — There's no such thing as a wholly "natural" disaster. The recent catastrophic floods in Jakarta and along the northern coast of Java, which claimed at least 200 lives, were no exception.
The Dutch colonial rulers chose the site of Jakarta for their administrative capital because of its proximity to the lucrative spice trade routes, not its environmental suitability. It was long famous as a swampy, disease-ridden death trap for the sailors, soldiers and bureaucrats sent out from the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies (they didn't concern themselves with the health of the slaves they brought from across Indonesia to populate the city).
Fifteen rivers converge in the Jakarta area, and every rainy season they swell quickly and massively. But the floods have been getting worse. Those in late January and early February were the worst in memory, far exceeding the damage caused by the major floods of 1996.
Global warming is almost definitely a contributing factor, and the Indonesian government is currently gathering data and exploring the possibility of asking for compensation from the United Nations. But there are other, more local, contributing factors as well.
Suharto's New Order regime opened Indonesia to foreign capital in the late 1960s, attracting investment through brutally repressive labour laws and low taxes. In the process the Orang Kaya Baru (New Rich) emerged.
The Greater Jakarta area was the site for most of this new wealth. New toll roads were built, factories sprang up in new industrial suburbs, while villas, hotels and golf courses were constructed for the new elite.
A favourite location for the playgrounds of the new rich was Puncak, in the mountains south of Jakarta, also once the favourite hill station for Dutch colonialists seeking respite from Jakarta's heat and humidity. Puncak is located in the headwaters of the Jakarta water catchment area. Forests were cleared rapidly, for timber, plantations and villa complexes. The water retention capacity of the Puncak area dropped considerably.
At the other end of the river systems, flood water used to be absorbed by mangrove forests along the coast. But these, too, were favourite spots for luxury housing complexes, golf courses and shopping centres. Other open areas around Jakarta were eyed greedily by developers of industrial zones.
Formally, green areas were protected by law, and enshrined in the 20-year Jakarta Master Plan (1985-2005). In practice, a few bribes and/or a business partner with the right military or political connections ensured that development could go ahead anywhere. In 1995 the Master Plan itself was revised, and several important green areas officially opened to development.
The results were seen at the height of the floods on February 1-2. In Jakarta, more than 300,000 people were displaced, more than 20 people drowned and major roads were blocked (including the toll road to the airport, past the luxury beachside complex Panti Indah Kapuk, built on a former mangrove forest). Large industrial areas were swamped, making thousands indefinitely unemployed. Disease mushroomed — at least 18,000 children were reported to be suffering from acute diarrhoea.
In the context of a continuing economic crisis and cuts demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to subsidies of basic necessities like cooking oil and electricity, the social impact has been disastrous.
At first, the worst effects were felt in working class and poor areas, for example, the industrial satellite town of Tanggerang. The better-maintained drainage systems of the central business district held out longer, but finally they too flooded. Other towns along the northern coast of Java have suffered floods and landslides, claiming around 200 lives.
The problem of flooding in Jakarta has long been recognised. The government sets aside funds to build canals and reforest areas to offset the problem, but the bulk of this money is siphoned off through corruption.
The technology exists to "seed" clouds chemically from aircraft, inducing the clouds to dump their load of rain before they reach the catchment areas of heavily populated areas. But the Indonesian state, in line with IMF demands, is reducing its spending on such projects, concentrating on repaying its massive debt to Western banks and governments. Of course the government is maintaining its "core functions", such as enriching bureaucrats and cronies, extracting tribute from the people and repressing their resistance to exploitation.
The government response to the floods was slow, inadequate and uncoordinated. The central government declared the floods a "common disaster" rather than a "national disaster", restricting the amount of funding made available.
Of the 263 refuges set up for displaced people, 75% had no medical staff. Flood victims, student organisations and NGOs have organised protests. One photo opportunity tour of flood areas by President Megawati Sukarnoputri was greeted by flood victims waving banners saying "We don't need your visit — we need food" and "We're inundated with water, while the government is inundated with money".
One Jakarta legal aid organisation, the Indonesia Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI), is organising a class action suit of flood victims against the Jakarta and national governments over the causes of, and the official response to, the floods.
For the moment, the common people of Indonesia have had to rely on each other. But feelings of solidarity are still strong, even in an atmosphere of crisis and "dog-eat-dog" neo-liberalism. Donations poured in for the flood victims. Everyone from banks, newspapers and supermarkets to the anti-Christian, gangster-run militia Laskar Jihad organised collection points for the donation of money and medicines.
The left-wing Peoples Democratic Party (PRD) and the National Student League for Democracy (LMND) set up coordination posts (posko) for the coordination of aid for flood victims. These have been expanded to become political centres, where students, workers, farmers and urban poor can meet to discuss the causes of the disaster, and the wider problems of the economic crisis and the IMF's austerity program. The posko have been relaunched as coordination posts for people's resistance to fuel, electricity and telephone subsidy cuts.
From Â鶹´«Ã½ Weekly, February 27, 2002.
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