The US-sponsored negotiations between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, resulting in the September 12 interim accord, began before Greece lifted its embargo on the neighbouring state. This was a setback for Macedonia's understandable insistence that the embargo be lifted before talks begin.
The US never had any intention of letting down its NATO ally on behalf of tiny, weak Macedonia, and refused full recognition until Greece's concerns were met. This is despite the conspiracy theories of right-wing and "left-wing" Greek nationalists, who were forever seeing the US using "Skopje" (Greece's name for the Macedonian republic) to undermine Greece. Just why the US would want to undermine Greece's loyal capitalist rulers was always a mystery. Yet the whole agreement is a defeat for the Greek government's attempt to destroy the new state. The embargo will be lifted and in any case had been only on paper for several months. Greece recognises the sovereignty of the new republic. Macedonia will drop its current flag, which displays a symbol from ancient Macedonia. Greece particularly objected to the flag, because the question of who "owns" the ancient people of world conqueror and slaughterer Alexander the Great has been important to nationalists on both sides. However, this flag was not an original issue in the dispute. One of Greece's other demands was that Macedonia change its constitution, yet in the accord it reaffirms its constitution, merely making an explanatory declaration about certain clauses. Until now, the Greek government's dishonest assertions that Macedonia's constitution contained articles which suggest a "Greater Macedonia" and hence territorial claims have been the main piece of propaganda with which the government has whipped up nationalistic hysteria. Supposedly the major difference has been Greece's demand that Macedonia change its name and adopt one that does not include the word Macedonia. Discussion of this is to begin later, yet no conditions have been set. While Greece has made no official statement, in practice the population is being groomed to accept the sort of combined name that Greece fought until now — "New" or "North" Macedonia, for example. For his part, Macedonian foreign minister Chervenkovski stated that "no promises" are being made.
Bipartisan support
In Greece, the agreement has the support of both the ruling PASOK and, with some polite reservations, the opposition New Democracy. The main opposition has come from a small populist-nationalist section of the gutter press. Their furious headlines about "betrayal" have been met by complete indifference from the mass of the population. Gone are the gigantic rallies, organised as they were by the entire state apparatus. The Coalition of the Left and Progress over the last couple of years has swung away from its original participation in the chauvinist tidal wave of 1991-92, and so was in favour of the spirit of the agreement. However, like New Democracy, it managed a little polite criticism of the government from the right, calling for all of Greece's 1992 demands to be met. To its credit, however, the Coalition opposed the US role, as did the Communist Party (KKE). The KKE had always opposed the chauvinist campaign over Macedonia and the embargo, and called for direct negotiations without US mediation. It declared that "the ease with which the 'obstacles' were overcome ... shows the differences were largely artificial, and the aim had been to maintain US-controlled instability throughout the region". The Rainbow party, representing the ethnic Macedonian minority in northern Greece, welcomed the agreement. Within Macedonia, the nationalist opposition — VMRO-DPMNE, MAAK (Conservative) and the Democratic Party — have opposed the agreement, particularly stressing that it leaves out all mention of the rights of the minority in northern Greece. However, in the agreement the two countries confirm their support for a long series of human rights conventions and declarations, some of which refer to Greece's treatment of the minority.
Nationalist contradiction
If Greece has been forced to accept the sovereignty of Macedonia, it is because the basic contradiction of the Greek nationalist position has come to the fore. For Greek capital, and particularly for small business in Greek Macedonia, the embargo against the neighbouring republic has meant a dramatic loss of opportunities to invest and trade, from a position of obvious economic power. Greek capital is capable of "conquering" Macedonia economically if it establishes normal relations. While it has been wasting this opportunity, rivals such as Turkey and Bulgaria have been making inroads. According to Sissy Vovou, from the Anti-Nationalist Anti-War Campaign, at the onset of the chauvinist campaign in late 1991, a group of Greek capitalists came out in open opposition for precisely these reasons, but soon swung into line. Vovou pointed out that the most extreme chauvinism came not from the capitalists but from Â鶹´«Ã½ of the middle class, generals, Orthodox bishops, populist media and the then opposition PASOK. Vovou emphasises the role of PASOK and the use of nationalism in party rivalry. "Socialist" PASOK, in reality a middle class populist party, campaigned furiously against the then ruling New Democracy, claiming that ND was about to "sell out" Greece. Leaders of ND, being more direct representatives of big capital, now admit that they did not want to follow the confrontational approach, but were forced into it by PASOK, and from then on the two parties tried to outdo each other. Now that PASOK is in power, however, it has come to the same "pragmatic" conclusions. However, if the nationalist ruling cliques in Serbia, Bulgaria or Albania had attempted to divide up Macedonia, Greece would have been ready to share in the spoils. The nationalism helped prepare the population for such an eventuality, but now it has become an impediment to the real economic game. Furthermore, the break-up of Yugoslavia occurred at a very opportune time for the Greek ruling class, trying to force through horrific economic adjustments, at the expense of Greek workers, to improve its competitive position within the European Union. Several years later, the massive cuts, privatisation, mass unemployment and the trebling of many prices while wages have remained low, indicate that the ruling class has been rather successful. The nationalistic atmosphere, directing the energy of the masses against an imaginary "foreign threat" rather than against the government, made it easier to get away with such policies. According to Vovou, more important was the role of nationalism among the traditional middle classes. While big Greek capital can compete in the European Union, much of the middle class will be crushed. This is the basis for large-scale populist nationalism. The final reason for trying to crush Macedonia was the feared effect an independent Macedonia might have in encouraging the related minority in northern Greece in its struggle for democratic rights. What remains to be seen is whether the legitimacy now conferred on the neighbouring state does indeed encourage this struggle, or alternatively, the dominant position of Greek capital further erodes national self-determination in practice.
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