Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West
By David Rieff
Vintage, 1995. 240pp., $17.95
Reviewed by Rob Graham
Part of the rapidly growing body of literature on the former Yugoslavia, this is a liberal journalist's largely first-hand account of the horror visited upon Bosnia.
Rieff made a number of visits to Bosnia after his initial assignment there to report on "ethnic cleansing" (of which he knew virtually nothing). What he saw determined him to be there as often as he could (despite the danger), and to write as passionately and forcefully as possible about what was happening, in the hope that his voice would awaken the world to the horror so that something would be done to stop it. This illusion didn't last; as he laments, "... the skies didn't darken over Auschwitz, and they would not darken over the hills of Bosnia".
His passionate support for the Bosnian cause, however, (though far from uncritical of the Bosnian government), remains undimmed. This is due to his understanding that it was politics, not genetics, that led to the genocide. He utterly rejects the racist assumptions that the Balkan peoples somehow programmed to slaughter each other every generation or so.
The first part of the book concentrates on his own shocked response, as well as that of residents and refugees he spoke to (mostly from a normal "middle class" background). It was basically unbelief that this could happen in "civilised" Europe. As he says, "A middle class upbringing is anything but the best preparation for life as a refugee".
The majority of the book, though, is a damning criticism of the UN, primarily of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
The "spearhead" of UN operations in Bosnia was the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), sent in after its supposed success in Kurdistan. The commission faced an impossible situation: few wars in history have had the generation of refugees as their primary objective.
Nevertheless, the heroism and bravery of the UNHCR personnel on the job stand out in stark contrast to UNPROFOR, which was so concerned about being "neutral" that the Bosnians were often treated as the aggressors. This was due to their insistence on defending their (UN-recognised) territorial integrity, rather than accepting defeat (which would have made it much easier for the UN).
Rieff's solution centres on NATO intervention, and though he accepts that any military intervention would not have been pleasant or simple, his faith in a benevolent NATO solving the major problems is naive. His analysis is basically of a morally corrupt UN that allowed the genocide to happen and Bosnia to be partitioned, without identifying the concrete reasons. (It would be interesting to know his attitude in the light of NATO's subsequent military intervention.)
This lack of analysis leads Rieff to almost total despair. Nevertheless, this is still a powerful and impassioned call for justice for the Bosnian people, well worth a read.