BY JEAN McSORLEY
Last month's announcement by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation that the preferred tenderer to supply its new nuclear reactor is an Argentinian company drew much media and public attention. The company concerned, INVAP, has been the subject of considerable criticism and comment.
However, an announcement two days later by ANSTO that it had formed a joint company with the French nuclear corporation Cogema to work on "plutonium disposition" received no attention in the Australian media. The Cogema-ANSTO deal, following closely on the Russia-US agreement to dispose of 68 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium from warheads, warrants close scrutiny.
As joint venturers, Cogema-ANSTO LLC will bid for a contract with the US Department of Energy to use their combined technologies to immobilise plutonium from US warheads. Whatever the benefits of this deal, there might also be drawbacks for Australia. In this context it is important to consider some of the difficulties related to plans to "dispose" of plutonium from military use.
Firstly, plutonium declared as "excess" for defence purposes must be accurately identified as having come from weapons. Verification of the removal of the plutonium and destruction of the warhead itself are essential steps in an irreversible disarmament process.
Secondly, to ensure that there is no other source of plutonium to replace that taken from warheads, existing separate stocks of unused plutonium should also form part of disarmament agreements.
Thirdly, there should be a halt on fissile material production to avoid any replacement of plutonium taken from either warheads or stockpiles. It's not just enough to dismantle the weapons, any alternative sources of plutonium must also be closed off.
Unfortunately, there is a complete stalemate on a legally binding treaty to halt plutonium production — although the five nuclear weapons states have claim they have stopped making it. The problem of separate stockpiles isn't even on the agenda.
Even when the plutonium is "released" from defence programs there are still many hurdles to overcome. Some advocate it is best "disposed" of by using it in mixed-oxide (MOX) uranium-plutonium fuel. There are, however, already significant concerns over the proliferation implications in using so-called "reactor-grade" (weapons-useable) plutonium in power reactors.
Using ex-defence plutonium by expanding MOX use would only add to existing environmental and proliferation problems. Because of these difficulties, most industry observers do not believe the majority of plutonium from defence programs will be use in civil nuclear programs.
If, instead, plutonium is sent for direct disposal, it will have to be incorporated into materials that cannot be processed to allow for re-conversion for weapons purposes. It will then have to be kept isolated and secure. Both of these measures are also held to be crucial to the concept of "irreversiblity" in disarmament.
However, as a seminar at the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference heard, the practicalities of securely disposing of plutonium from defence programs are not clear-cut.
The most favoured option in the US for immobilising the plutonium is the "can-in-canister" method — this is where Cogema-ANSTO expects to play its part. ANSTO hopes to supply the technology for the ceramic (Synroc) to incorporate the plutonium, whilst Cogema will supply the vitrified glass (containing high level radioactive waste) which will be used to encapsulate the plutonium.
There are, however, concerns that the can-in-canister does not meet the technical requirements of the "spent fuel standard" — that is, making the package radioactive enough to deter those who might want to re-use the plutonium for weapons.
Experiments using explosives and laser cutting have been undertaken to measure the integrity of the can-in-canister. To date those experiments have not yielded conclusive evidence on the ability of this waste-form to completely withstand attempts to extract plutonium for future use.
It is argued that in order to further mitigate against future re-use, the plutonium must then be put in secure, deep geological repositories. However, apart from the many environmental problems concerning this proposal, there are other issues at stake.
Could such a repository be entrusted to any of the nuclear weapons states? Given their track record on disarmament and proliferation, the international community is hardly likely to want to entrust this material to any of the nuclear weapons powers.
Where then should it go? Not surprisingly, Australia has been put forward as a suitable host country, not only because of Synroc, but also because of the perception it has good non-proliferation credentials.
However, the cynical view is that Australia is being pressured to play a part in the "solution" because it is part of the problem — through uranium exports, plutonium-separation agreements (from spent fuel containing Australian uranium), through spent fuel reprocessing deals with France and Britain and through agreeing to dispose of spent fuel in the US. Thus, either through guilt or self-righteousness, Australia should agree to host a disposal.
By becoming a partner with one of the most infamous nuclear companies in the world, Australia has probably not done itself any favours. Cogema is notorious for operating the La Hague nuclear facility, the world's second-largest routine emitter of radioactive discharges — a site which also creates vast amounts of radioactive wastes through spent fuel reprocessing.
Here, then, is the crux of the problem. For whilst the military and civil nuclear industry continues to produce more nuclear materials and radioactive wastes, yet ignoring current stockpiles, then talk of a "solution" is nonsense. That the Cogema-ANSTO deal was not subject to parliamentary scrutiny will only add to public disquiet — for it seems this country is getting ever deeper into the nuclear morass with no discussion over the potential long-term pitfalls.
[Jean McSorley has worked as an anti-nuclear campaigner in Europe, Australia and Asia. She is the author of Living in the Shadow, the Story of the People of Sellafield, Pan books, 1990.]